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Forging Success: Soviet Managersand False Accounting, 1943 to 1962
I just wanted to say that pripiski are a system. And this system continues to
operate despite decades of monitoring and so on. That’s the first thing. Here’s
the second: in practice, criminal penalization of pripiski is a rare event,
regardless of the level of the enterprise. And the third is that the gunfire on
pripiski is concentrated on petty targets, on enterprises. The enterprises are
certainly accountable for it, but as we raise our sights, [our gunfire] weakens
when the target becomes more significant. Do you understand? (A Soviet
statistical official, interviewed in 1989.)1
Soviet managers worked from day to day within in a target-driven culture. The
Politburo set overarching priorities, from which planners set ministerial and regional
production quotas or “plans.” Ministries and regional authorities disaggregated the
plans to factories, farms, and offices. Production (including construction and
transportation) quotas were usually in rubles at “fixed” plan prices. Procurement
quotas for agricultural and forestry products were in units of weight or volume. The
ratio of performance to plan formed the personal rewards and reputations of most
officials and managers.
Did managers shade the truth about performance? That this was common is
suggested by the emergence of a specialized Soviet jargon. Everyone used the verb
pripisyvat’, literally “to add on,” to mean the inclusion of fictional goods in the
report of plan fulfillment. The noun pripiska (plural pripiski) defined the “add-ons,”
the fictional goods added into the plan report.
In terms of the economics of information, pripiski should be thought of as
potentially both apparent to an attentive observer and verifiable to a third party
such as a court. We are not discussing the sort of unobservable or unverifiable
shading implied by the manipulation of hidden qualities of goods and services.
Pripiski generally involved unambiguous lies.
In Soviet law, such lies were doubly incriminating. First, since the plans
themselves had the force of law, to lie about their fulfillment was not only a moral
violation (“deception of the state and party”) but a violation of the USSR criminal
code. Second, bare-faced lies risked immediate exposure unless they were signed off
by others that were in a position to know the truth, so pripiski frequently involved
the aggravating circumstance of conspiracy to break the law.
The phenomenon of false accounting among Soviet managers raises many
questions for historians and social scientists. Historians of the Russian and Soviet
1 Hoover Archive, Paul R. Gregory collection, Box 1 (document titled “Nachalo 3-
go interv’iu”; the passage cited is on page 9).
2economy have long been curious to know: How widespread were cases of pripiski? If
widespread, did they significantly affect our measures of real output and real
growth? If they affected supply measures, how did they affect consistent measures
of intermediate and final consumption? Since pripiski required criminal collusion,
how was collusion maintained and enforced? Finally, what were the limiting factors
on pripiski: Why didn’t they grow indefinitely -- or did they?
Questions also arise from a social-science perspective. We are studying a
command economy under a harsh dictator. It must be destructive of such
institutions when agents can cheat principals, and most certainly when they
successfully collude with each other to do so. We have historical data that relate to a
kind of cheating that in principle was both observable and verifiable; we are not
discussing unverifiable shading. These data allow us to ask: In playing the dangerous
game of false accounting, how did agents collude and how far did they go? How did
the dictator’s own loyal agents perceive the offense of false accounting, and
conspiracy to account falsely for success, and how did they penalize it?
In this paper, I first review various literatures that can contribute to
understanding our topic from varying standpoints. Second, I describe the data from
once closed Soviet-era archives that I draw on for this study. Third, I narrate a small
number of apparently typical crime stories. I consider, fourth, what we can infer
about undetected crime; and fifth, the fit between punishment and crime,
conditional on detection. Sixth, there are implications for Soviet managers as
rational agents.
The final section concludes as follows. The evidence of detected crimes is
consistent with a background of undetected offending that was pervasive but low-
level. Conspiratorial networks may have had an optimal size to avoid detection.
Despite the criminality of false accounting, the authorities had difficulty with
committing to criminalize it; it was normal for offenses that were detected to be
punished leniently by the use of administrative or party reprimands, without
reference to the courts. Leniency may have been exercised disproportionately on
behalf of politically connected offenders, even during crackdowns, and perhaps
especially then. The patterns we observe suggest short run optimizing by managers
with the intermediate objective of fulfilling the plan. In the medium run, we see
herd effects, leading to periodic overinvestment in interpersonal trust.The Literature
Soviet managers’ rule breaking is addressed by several historical and social science
literatures. Previous research on the behaviour of managers in the Soviet command
economy (Berliner 1957, Granick 1960) has generally accepted that Soviet managers
pursued multiple objectives including personal income, promotion, a quiet life.
Implicitly or explicitly, however, most of these resolved into one objective: fulfill the
plan (Kontorovich 1986). To fulfill the plan, managers had to know which rules to
break (Gregory 1990; Belova 2001). They also needed to know who would cover for
them if detection threatened, particularly because the authorities could not readily
tell the difference between loyal and disloyal rule breaking (Gregory 1990). For this
3reason ZiS – an acronym with a double meaning: a luxury brand of Soviet
automobile, and an abbreviation of znakomstvo i sviazi, networks of “acquaintance
and contacts” – was crucial. Such networks were vulnerable to the prisoner’s
dilemma, but defended by the tradition of krugovaia poruka, or collective
responsibility (Ledeneva 2007).
False accounting was investigated specifically in the Sovietological literature,
both from press reports and from interviews with emigrating Soviet economic
officials. Providing a number of early examples, Alec Nove (1956) formulated his
widely cited law of “equal cheating.” Accepting that false accounting would surely
affect measures of the level of Soviet output:
Over the economy as a whole, there is no reason to suppose that Soviet
managers and their accountants falsify more in one year than in another, and so
the rate of growth is unlikely to be exaggerated on that account.
Investigations of the same era by Joseph Berliner (1957) and Gregory Grossman
(1960) added not only examples but also further evaluations. Berliner’s informants,
for example, suggested that “Taking a figure out of the air” is “a great crime and is
rarely risked”; but decisions are “frequently” taken to “prolong the day” (and
month), or to “borrow” output from the next accounting period to fulfill this
period’s plan.
Over time the volumes of both media reporting and emigrant testimony
increased. A survey by Stephen Shenfield (1983) suggested that what was known
from such sources was likely to be the tip of a vast iceberg of undetected crime.
Shenfield countered Nove’s law of equal cheating with the hypothesis that false
accounting might rise and fall with plan tension; the more ambitious the plan, the
more likely it was to be fulfilled with false reports.
A survey of former statistical personnel by Shenfield and Hanson (1986)
concluded: “Pripiski are indeed widespread, but not as a general rule large.” A
former ministry official stated: “a serious person does not falsify report data,
because falsification is very dangerous. Everyone is checking up all the time.” A
managers’ survey by Susan Linz (1988) reached a similar conclusion: Nearly all her
respondents (except accountants!) “were quite familiar with falsified reports” but
“uniformly describe falsifying only marginal magnitudes: “Nobody complains about
small errors,” but “Falsification on a grand scale is dangerous.” At the end of the
Soviet era Paul Gregory (1990) surmised that the authorities “tolerate small
deceptions, but they are unwilling to accept large ones.”
As Robert Porter (2005) has noted, white collar crimes involving collusion can be
hard to detect unless an insider will blow the whistle. Whistleblowers played an
important role in exposing management abuses in the Soviet economy (Lampert
1983, 1985). Whistleblowing was facilitated by the ready supply of evidence of
wrongdoing: working under everyday Soviet arrangements, everyone was guilty of
some infraction or other.
If the supply was abundant, Soviet principals also showed a high level of demand
for evidence of their subordinates’ wrongdoing. Proof of bad behavior went by the
4generic term kompromat, short for “compromising documents.” Principals could
exploit kompromat in more than one way. Obviously, they could use it to penalize
those that merited punishment. Less obviously, they could use it to control those
with a compromised past, and were often willing to recruit and promote those
against whom kompromat was held (Ledeneva 2007, Gregory 2009).
The fact that, given proof of wrong doing, Soviet officials often chose to keep it
in reserve rather than use it in evidence to punish, is just one aspect of a wider
phenomenon in Soviet justice: an inability to commit to punishment of party
violators. The many burdensome demands laid on their shoulders ensured that party
members regularly had to commit infractions to get the job done. When a party
member broke the rules, their superiors commonly did not know whether the
violator had acted from loyal or self-serving impulses, and whether the action that
was called for on their own part should be, in the phrase of Markevich (2007) “to
punish or to assist.” An atmosphere of impunity would encourage opportunism. But
too hasty punishment would write off the party’s investment in a most likely loyal
member. After the indiscriminate bloodletting of the Great Terror, Stalin learned the
value of human capital. The evidence of the postwar years (Belova and Lazarev
2009) is that the loyalty constraint on party members became as soft as the financial
constraints on the enterprises they managed.
The problem of correction was often accentuated by the complicity of the
correctors in the crime. Farm and enterprise managers were directly overlooked by
local party and government officials, but such officials relied on the smooth
fulfillment of plans in their own localities to become known as effective organizers
of production and procurement and so win promotion or avoid criticism. This could
make them ready accomplices of the primary producers or sellers in falsely
accounting for the plan. Aware that he could not rely on the executive hierarchies of
the party and state to tell him the disinterested truth, Stalin gave the role of truth-
telling to a narrow circle of agencies specialized in planning, statistics, and party
discipline, and police work (Gregory 1990; Belova and Gregory 2002). One of these
was the party’s “control commission,” charged with the correction of malfeasance
by party members (Getty 1997; Markevich 2007).
The Soviet authorities’ inability to commit to punish party violators was matched
by its inability to commit to protect the whistleblowers that exposed them.
Lampert’s pathbreaking studies (1983, 1985) showed that Soviet whistleblowing was
an activity with few external rewards and many penalties. Although encouraged
from above, whistleblowers could be seen as trouble makers for their peers – and so
were often hated by them. In an invented dialogue, Lampert (1985) described
whistleblowers as “the totalitarians of the piece, spying on their colleagues and
fellow workers and setting themselves up as agents for the prying eyes of the state.”
Since whistleblowers often complained about their immediate superiors, who were
much closer to them than the remote authorities to whom the whistleblowers could
appeal, retaliation and victimization were normal.
What drove such lone voices to speak out against violations and abuses despite
the obstacles put in their way? In some cases, fear of keeping silent must have been
a factor, since the authorities frequently penalized those that “must have known”
5yet acquiesced in wrong doing. Newcomers may have been more likely to speak out,
since silence would mean accepting responsibility for past malpractices from which
they were unlikely to benefit.2 In other cases, whistleblowers were clearly driven by
inner beliefs, such as personal commitment to Soviet legality and ideals (Harrison
2008 provides an example).
The general social science literature is suggestive of the personal characteristics
of white collar criminals. Lance Lochner (2004) has noted that white collar crime is
increasing in human capital; the propensity to offend declines more slowly in age
and education than for less skilled or more violent crimes. Empirical sociologists
have contributed cross sectional comparisons of high ranking white collar criminals
and business executives. In many respects, for example intelligence, offending and
non-offending managers have turned out to have similar profiles. Collins and
Schmidt (1993) found that in the United States white collar criminals displayed
relatively low “social conscientiousness” or personal integrity – not surprisingly,
perhaps. More recently Blickle, Fassbender, Klein, and Schlegel (2006) put a twist
into the story by showing that, in Europe, white collar criminals “combine high
conscientiousness with low integrity.” This is intriguing when combined with the
observation that many white collar offenses have blurred motivation (Braithwaite
1985): offenders appear to break rules sometimes for personal gain, sometimes for
corporate advantage.
Economists divide on the status of inner motivation and ethical constraints on
the propensity to offend. Becker’s (1968) canonical approach suggests that a person
commits a crime when the expected subjective gain from the offense, net of
punishment conditional on detection, is positive. The shape of the person’s
psychology is excluded as irrelevant. This simplifying limitation has not prevented
the economic analysis of deterrence and detection from making significant
contributions, for example, Jeffrey Grogger’s (1991) finding that the returns to an
increase in certainty of punishment tend to exceed those to an increase in its
severity of the same proportion.
Experimental and behavioral approaches to rule breaking have also provided
relevant insights. One finding relevant to hierarchal systems and command
economies is that intensive monitoring does not only reduce openness to corrupt
opportunities of higher value; it also reduces intrinsic honesty (Schulze and Frank
2003). Another finding is that, according to Nina Mazar and Dan Ariely (2006), the
relationship between dishonesty and opportunity is non-linear. Most adults have an
internal psychological mechanism that rewards ethical behavior. This mechanism
permits minor rearrangement of the truth, but inhibits gross dishonesty, even in the
absence of external checks, until the external reward is substantial.
Consistently, a recent systematic review of the literature on scientific fraud by
Daniele Fanelli (2009) found that an average of 2 per cent of scientific workers
(across a number of studies) admitted to falsifying data to obtain desired results,
while up to one third admitted to less serious-sounding malpractices such as
2 Thanks to Paul Gregory for this point.
6dropping data points. Much higher proportions were aware of such practices by
others (without necessarily having reported them).
More generally, Andrew Clark and Andrew Oswald (1998) have shown that how
a person reacts to others’ behavior depends on the comparison term in their utility
function: the majority, with comparison-concave utility, is conformist, while a
minority with comparison-convex utility acts deviantly. The empirical relevance of
conformism can be illustrated by a recent sample of Harvard MBA students (Scott
Snook forthcoming), of which one third operated from a largely transactional view of
the world (it's okay if it benefits me); another third were predominantly other-
directed (it's okay if others do it too); leaving only one third to have reached a fully-
developed, self-authored adult perspective (it’s okay because, having fully-weighed
the costs and benefits to others, I have decided that it is).The Data
Much of the evidence on false accounting in Soviet enterprises that was previously
available was gathered in the course of interviews with Soviet emigrants. Emigrant
testimony was limited by selection, because the Soviet authorities permitted only
low-level personnel to emigrate, and by the impressionistic quality resulting from
the fact that the interviewees were often distant in place and time from relevant
events. Other evidence was gathered from Soviet press reports; these were
censored beforehand and selected for disclosure only when they were considered to
support the goals of public policy.
Compared with the evidence previously available, the social scientist and
historical researcher will find several advantages in the official records left by the
Soviet courts, prosecutors, and party controllers. These are direct records of the
behaviors that interest us. They have not been previously selected in order to limit
disclosure or bias public perceptions. They are amenable to quantitative analysis.
Our new evidence comes in three parts. First, on July 16, 1946, the Soviet
government issued a secret decree “On pripiski to state accountability for fulfillment
of plans.” Condemning pripiski as a “criminal, anti-state practice,” and the
“liberalism” shown towards them by prosecutors and the courts, the decree called
for “resolute struggle” against offenders.
Hoover Archive records show that, in four months, October 1946 to January
1947, the courts heard 129 cases involving 249 persons, of whom 242 were
convicted.3 Defendants were typically given jail time. Four were condemned to
death (with the centre’s approval). A handful received suspended terms of forced
labour at place of work; the centre criticized and/or appealed these more lenient
sentences.
The justice ministries of all union republics were required to submit monthly
reports to Moscow on implementation – but only seven did so (Armenia, Estonia,
3 Hoover Institution, Archives of the Soviet Communist Party and Soviet State
Microfilm Collection: GARF (State Archive of the Russian Federation), fond R-9492
(files of the USSR Ministry of Justice), opis 1a, file 495.
7Georgia, Kirgizia, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldavia, and Tadzhik republic did not report at
all!). Of the 129 cases, 59 were selected for summary in monthly reports. Summaries
are brief; rarely extending over more than a single paragraph, they typically specify
all those brought to account, the scale of offenses, and the verdicts and sentences of
the court. The 59 summaries form one of the two datasets used in this paper.
The second dataset arises as follows. Soviet managers were generally party
members. When party members committed a legal violation, before they could go
to trial, they had to be expelled from the party (Shenfield and Hanson 1986). Before
possible expulsion, they had to be investigated. Initial party investigation was
generally done by local (ward, city, and district) party committees. However, there
was also a national agency, the party control commission (KPK), to which
complainants could turn (Getty 1997; Markevich 2007). This seems to have
happened most commonly when local investigations were perceived to have been
wrongly concluded or delayed, but it also happened in the first instance.
Records in the Hoover Archive show that, between 1943 and 1962, party control
investigators reported on 101 cases of pripiski.4 In 13, the complaint was found to be
not proven, leaving 88 that were considered proven. (Of the proven cases, 63 were
concluded by the investigator, leaving 15 open to further review.) The 88 party
control investigations form our second dataset.
The party control reports follow a narrative format, listing the original
complaint, the results of prior investigation (if any), the facts as seen by the
investigator, and recommendations for further action as appropriate. The typical
party control report is considerably more detailed than the court summaries, usually
occupying at least one page and sometimes many pages; but they are also more
variable in format and the factual aspects covered.
The two datasets are described and compared in Table 1. In addition to basic
enumeration, the table gives some indication of the composition of cases in each
dataset by geographical and economic setting, type of offense, the numbers of
accused persons, the responsibilities of the accused, the extent of falsification for
which they answered, and the value of private gain obtained as a result.
The geography of the two datasets differs substantially. Table 1 uses a single
measure, the mean distance of offenses from Moscow. Offenses prosecuted in the
courts after the war were on average twice as distant, more than 1,600 kilometers
from the centre of power, than those investigated within the party. This discrepancy
will throw light on how cases were selected for investigation and punishment.
4 Hoover Institution, Archives of the Soviet Communist Party and Soviet State
Microfilm Collection: RGANI (Russian State Archive of Contemporary History), fond 6
(files of the Soviet Communist Party Committee of Party Control), opis 6, files 1583,
1652, 1706, 1765, 1815, and 1816.
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The Courts Party Control
Number of cases 59 101
Year of first case 1943 1943
Last case 1947 1962
Number of cases proven 59 88
Not proven … 13
Proven cases, location:
Mean distance from Moscow, km 58 (1,674) 84 (799)
Proven cases by production branch:
Agriculture and food distribution 28 (47%) 29 (33%)
Construction 7 (12%) 10 (11%)
Industry 20 (34%) 45 (51%)
Timber 4 (7%) 1 (1%)
Transport … … 3 (3%)
Proven cases by type (“crime story”):*
BRIBE (false receipt for bribe) 3 (5%)
DC (double counting or carousel fraud) … … 13 (15%)
HID (hidden inputs) … … 3 (3%)
IOU (false receipt, redeemable) … 12 (14%)
PRICE (inflated price) 1 (2%) 1 (1%)
SUB (substitution) … … 12 (14%)
WIP (work in progress) 1 (2%) 22 (25%)
WO (inventories written off) … … 4 (5%)
NS (not specified) 54 (92%) 33 (38%)
Proven cases, number of accused:
Total of accused persons 164 454
Median (mean) per case 2 (2.78) 3 (5.16)
Accused persons by role:
Supplier 136 (83%) 306 (67%)
Supplier's internal party committee … … 18 (4%)
Supplier's superior:
Local party 2 (1%) 45 (10%)
Local government 7 (4%) 40 (9%)
Ministerial administration … … 7 (2%)
Buyer 19 (12%) 38 (8%)
Proven cases, extent of falsification:
False account, % of plan (median value) 10 (22%) 29 (16%)
Private gain, rubles (median value) 20 (47,605) 11 (41,000)
* Key to “crime stories” (totals sum to more than 100% because some cases involved
more than one type of offense):
BRIBE (false receipt for bribe): The seller met the plan with a false receipt
obtained by bribing a state buyer.
9DC (double counting or carousel fraud): The seller met the plan by reselling to
the state buyer goods illegally bought back from state inventories or the population
rather than producing them as planned.
HID (hidden inventories): The seller met the plan with the help of inventories
hidden from the planner.
IOU (false receipt, redeemable): The seller met the plan with a receipt obtained
from a state buyer; the seller was obliged to redeem the IOU in future with goods or
compensate the buyer with a cash premium in case of default.
PRICE (inflated price): The seller met the plan by illegally inflating the plan price.
SUB (substitution): The seller met the plan by illegally substituting inferior
goods.
WIP (work in progress): The seller met the plan by illegally reporting work in
progress as finished output.
WO (inventories written off): The seller met the plan for an inventory, then
wrote the inventory off to wastage with the aim of embezzling the value of the
stock.
NS (not specified).
Sources: Appendices 1 and 2.
If we look at the production branch where falsification occurred, we see that
agriculture, industry, and construction accounted for almost all cases. The court
cases appear representative in so far as, in 1950, industry and construction
accounted for 27 percent of the Soviet workforce (including collective farmers) and
agriculture and forestry for 48 percent (TsSU 1968, p. 20). By 1959 the national
proportions had shifted to 39 percent (in agriculture and forestry) and 32 percent (in
industry and construction) (TsSU 1962, p. 104), but even by this later standard
industry and construction were considerably overrepresented in the cases taken
under party control. It may be significant, in this male-dominated system, that the
party control proportions are closer to those for male employment in 1959.
Table 1 provides a rough classification of cases by the underlying “crime story”
of offending behaviour. Notes to the table give more detail of each story. Virtually all
our information on this score comes from the party control sample. In practice, only
four types of offense were quantitatively important; we will find that each was
characteristic of a particular production context. These were the offenses that I will
describe as the “double counting” scam (or carousel fraud); the IOU or “false
receipt” scam; the “substitution” scam; and the “work-in-progress” scam (or
“borrowing from the future”).
While some cases involved a single defendant, the typical case involved two (in
the courts) or three (under party control). We will see considerable variation; a few
cases were very large indeed. The largest court case in our data involved 12
defendants, but the large case under party control appears to have involved more
than 70 conspirators that shared guilty knowledge of the offense.
While collusion was normal, the types of collusion represented in cases
prosecuted differ markedly from those dealt with under party control. In addition to
those directly responsible as low-level agents, the party control investigators dealt
with a wide range of superiors in the party, government, and economic hierarchies
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that shared guilty knowledge of lower level wrongdoing. But these superiors rarely
featured in postwar court appearances.
How much was lost – and gained – as a result of pripiski? In each dataset a
minority of cases is detailed enough to allow evaluation of the plan shortfall that
was covered by lying. In proportion to the plan, over various production profiles and
periods of time, the amounts involved could be substantial; the median lie before
the courts amounted to 22% of the plan (for a duration of 6 months) and that under
party control to 16%. This was more than just “rounding upwards.”
The private gain from pripiski could also be considerable. It came primarily in the
form of illegal bonuses from falsely claiming successful fulfilment of the plan. The
private gain could be shared among many accused, and among innocent people too,
but the median value reported to the courts was nearly 50,000 rubles (with a
maximum of 400,000); the median gain under party control was more than 40,000
rubles (with a maximum of more than one million). In comparison, the average
monthly wage of a Soviet public sector employee was around 570 rubles in 1946,
rising to 1,000 in 1961 (Nove 1966).
Finally, the time profile of cases is of interest. The postwar court cases were
processed within a few months. Chart 1 shows the dynamic of cases before the
Russian Federation courts over four months of 1946 and 1947; these accounted for
four fifths of all cases across the country.
Chart 1. Cases in the RSFSR Courts, October 1946 to January 1947
Source: Hoover/GARF, R-9492/1a/495, folio 36 (USSR Ministry of Justice, inspector
of general courts Chugunov, "Obobshchenie sudeb'noi praktiki po delam o
pripiskakh k gosudarstvennoi otchetnosti po vypolneniiu planov,” April 1947).
After an initial flurry, from the autumn of 1946 the frequency of cases was in
monotonic decline. By the late spring of 1947 most republics, if they continued to
report, cited one or two cases per month or none at all. In June 1947 the RSFSR
minister of justice asked to be released from the obligation to report monthly on the
grounds that the number of fresh cases had fallen to an insignificant level, and none
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involved offenses committed since the 1946 decree.5 The last document in the file is
a report from Kazakhstan: “No cases of this category have come before the Kazakh
SSR courts since April 1947 ... I ask for your instructions on the necessity of
informing you about the cases indicated above.”6 Other republics seem to have
freed themselves from the obligation to report by failing to do so. It can be inferred
that the background or normal frequency of court cases involving pripiski was
approximately zero.
Taking the campaign at its most intense, the number of cases appears notably
small. This was a country of two hundred million citizens, with tens of thousands of
farms and factories, yet a determined drive against false accounting could produce
at most 40 prosecutions a month in the largest of its republics.
Chart 2. Cases Under Party Control, 1943 to 1962
Source: As Appendix 2.
The profile of cases under party control, tracked year by year over two decades
in Chart 2, adds notably to this picture. On an annual basis, the flow of cases was
again meager. One explanation may be that nearly all cases under party
investigation were concluded locally; when we see the cases selected for central
party control, we are surely looking at the tip of a much larger iceberg. Considered
over time, there are three distinct peaks, the first in wartime when the data start;
the second in the last full year of Stalin’s rule (he died in March, 1953); and the third
and most dramatic in 1960. After each peak, the annual value of the series falls to
zero or almost zero. Underlying this fluctuation may have been swings in the
underlying propensity to offend, but it is also likely that party controllers had limited
5 Hoover/GARF, R-9492/1a/495, folio 47 (RSFSR minister of justice Basavin,
memorandum to USSR minister of justice Rychkov N. M., June 18, 1947).
6 Hoover/GARF, R-9492/1a/495, folio 51 (Kazakh SSR, deputy minister of justice
Bespal’ko L., memorandum to USSR minister of justice Rychkov N. M., Dec. 4, 1947).
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attention and other resources and reallocated it from time to time in line with the
shifting priorities of their own superiors.
The Hoover Archive also provides a third dataset, not enumerated in Table 1,
and of relatively incidental importance. This is a file of seven cases kept by the USSR
Procurator’s Office in 1948 and 1949.7 The only feature these cases appear to have
in common is that in various ways they were difficult to prosecute.Crime Stories
What were the typical features of the crime of false accounting? These are, at first
sight, bewilderingly diverse. On closer inspection, only a few stories mattered. Table
3 classifies the frequency of these stories by the production sector in which they
transpired. We see that agriculture yielded stories of double counting (DC) and false
receipts (IOU); from industry and construction come stories of substitution (SUB)
and work in progress (WIP). Other stories are rare and untypical.
Table 2. Crime Stories Under Party Control by Production Sector, 1943 to 1962
Agri-
culture
Con-
struction Industry Timber Transport Total
DC 12 .. 1 .. .. 13
HID 1 .. 2 .. .. 3
IOU 11 .. 1 .. .. 12
PRICE .. .. 1 .. .. 1
SUB 3 2 5 .. 2 12
WIP .. 2 20 .. .. 22
WO 1 2 1 .. .. 4
NS 6 7 18 1 1 33
Total 34 13 49 1 3 100
Sources and definitions: As Table 1.
The Work-In-Progress Scam
Sometimes the seller met the plan by illegally reporting work in progress as finished
output. Case 205 (1943) provides a straightforward story that emerged from a
factory audit by the regional party control commissioner for Cheliabinsk, a major
centre of war production in the Urals. On August 31, 1943, Director Moroz of tank
factory no. 255 reported to Moscow that the August plan was fulfilled 100%. In
truth, the August plan was completed only on September 15. This had the natural
consequence that on the last day of the month 44% of the September plan was still
outstanding.
At this point the local party stepped in, not to correct but to collude with
concealment of the overstatement. Cheliabinsk oblast party secretary for the tank
7 Hoover Institution, Archives of the Soviet Communist Party and Soviet State
Microfilm Collection: RGANI (Russian State Archive of Contemporary History), fond
R-8131 (files of the USSR state prosecutor), opis 25, file 583.
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industry Malenenko tasked Moroz to complete the September plan by October 5,
i.e. to achieve 44% of the monthly quota in five days. On October 2, Moroz reported
100.3% fulfillment to Moscow.
On October 6, Minister of the tank industry Malyshev congratulated the factory,
awarding it third prize in a nationwide inter-factory “socialist competition.” The
party control commissioner adds that when the workers heard of the prize they
were indignant, knowing it was undeserved, so Moroz concealed both Malyshev's
congratulations and the fact that the prize was for September.
The September plan was actually completed on October 15; the factory’s output
as reported to Moscow in those first two weeks of October was zero. Recounting
this and similar cases, the party control investigator recommended further
discussion and interventions to curtail the practice.
Chart 3. Monthly Storming at Aircraft Factory no. 7 (Moscow), 1939
Source: Mukhin (2008, p. 202).
The work-in-progress scam has relevance for the literature on the topic of
“storming” in command economies (Hutchings 1971; Rostowski and Auerbach 1986;
1988; Mukhin 2008). Like pripiski, the prevalence of storming is evidenced by the
spread of its own jargon, shturmovshchina. According to the specialist literature, a
common feature of Soviet-type enterprise management was the bunching of effort
at the end of the plan period. Subjected to plan deadlines, managers and workers
would idle away the early part of the accounting period, and then meet the plan
with a burst of effort in the last days before the deadline. For illustration, consider
the time profile of output at aircraft factory no. 7 within the summer months of
1939, shown in Chart 3.
Storming is observationally identical with the work-in-progress scam, but the
two are theoretically quite different. The work-in-progress scam is readily
rationalized as a smoothing of effort in the expectation that the enterprise can
return to plan compliance in future, at some date later the planner’s deadline.
Storming, in contrast, involves a deliberate and predictable deviation from
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smoothing, and so requires some additional (if plausible) behavioral or cognitive
restriction on rationality. This raises a question that we cannot answer right now:
did storming ever truly exist – or was it just a fiction that managers invented to
blame the workforce for apparently uneven effort and so provide a convenient
cover for their own work-in-progress scams?
The Substitution Scam
Sometimes the seller met the plan by illegally substituting inferior goods. The goods
delivered could be inferior simply by being unfinished, but this differed from the
work-in-progress scam by the fact that there was no intention to finish them in
future. Case 261 (1960) involved large-scale substitution in construction. In the late
1950s party leader Nikita Khrushchev made a big commitment to resolve the
postwar urban housing shortage. A party control investigation into Cheliabinsk city
construction was prompted by a press report of wrongdoing by seven top officials of
city and district party, which party control took up because the press reporting did
not lead to corrective action.
Investigation showed that Cheliabinsk was adding to its urban construction at a
rapid pace: in 1960, Cheliabinsk 279,000 cubic meters of residential housing, 1,415
kinder-garten places, and 3,800 school places. Of the annual residential construction
plan, more than half was completed during the month of December alone (there
were similar figures for December in 1959 and 1958). In the last days of December
1960, the city party and government leaders illegally accepted as finished 36
apartment blocks of 50,000 square metres that lacked floors, plastering, water
supplies, drainage, heating; in some cases there no roofs, and in others, no
paintwork, glasswork, sinks, or toilets. This was also the pattern of previous years;
repairs to new housing added in 1959 had cost 11 million rubles, and 16 million to
repair that added in 1958. A new boarding school and four of six new kindergartens
were closed or never opened. The scandal was effectively public, since residents
were up in arms. In face of criticism, however, the district party had not only taken
no action but had defended those responsible.
The investigation noted that the false reports had enabled the city
administration to receive large illegal bonuses continued to be paid; in 1959, for
example, one million rubles to reward fulfillment of a plan that the city executive
itself had illegally reduced. Included in this was the sum of 53,000 rubles paid to the
city construction administration. As for action, the investigator recommended
discussion by the party Central Committee for further review.
Substitution scams also took place in industry. Case 237 (1953) concerns brick
factory no. 5 of the interior ministry (MVD), located near Moscow in the town of
Istrino. MVD ownership means that the workforce was made up by prisoners; the
complainant was the former factory director (titled “commandant”) Selivanov.
Selivanov made several complaints against the current director Vasilevskii, his
deputy Kletskin, and the chief engineer Berezovskii, including an allegation of
pripiski.
With regard to pripiski, investigation found that Vasilevskii had included in the
December 1951 plan 345,500 bricks that were not sorted or submitted to internal
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quality control until January; substandard bricks were mixed with high-grade bricks;
the factory received illegal bonuses as a result. A feature common in many such
crime stories is that pripiski were mixed with other kinds of malfeasance. In 1951,
for example, Vasilevskii had paid Berezovskii 1,200 rubles for work he had not done.
In 1952 Berezovskii diverted labour, materials, and transport to build a memorial for
his father for which he did not reimburse the factory. He also paid 4,134 rubles to an
Odintsovo factory worker for repair of an excavator; the worker did no actual work,
but supplied parts and machinery stolen from the Odintsovo factory. So, petty theft
and embezzlement cropped up alongside false accounting.
As for action, the investigation noted that the Istrino ward party committee and
the USSR ministry of state control had previously investigated the case and had
already imposed reprimands and demotions; unusually, Berezovskii was dismissed
permanently from the MVD “system,” meaning that he was not given other work
but cast adrift in the general labour market. In view of this, the party controllers
closed the file.
The case had an aftermath, involving a threat to victimize the initial
complainant. Party member Osipov complained to the party control commission
that former director Selivanov, in making his original complaint, had slandered the
current factory leadership. Osipov did not say what the slander was and did not
attend when invited for interview. This further complaint was rejected.
The IOU Scam
In agricultural procurements it could happen that the seller met the plan with a
receipt obtained from a state buyer, without goods having changed hands. This
receipt, effectively an IOU, was known as a bestovarnaia kvitantsiia (commodity-less
receipt), but it appears that the more correct term was a sokhrannaia raspiska
(storage certificate). In this way the sale took place and was reported as complete
for purposes of the plan; at the same time, the seller agreed to store the goods until
delivery at a later date.
If delivery took place later as agreed, this was quite similar to the work-in-
progress scam. Often, however, it did not take place, and buyer and seller shared
this expectation. Produce might be “stored” in the fields as a standing crop, where it
could easily be spoiled before harvest, or in farm inventories where it might be
consumed before delivery; “storage” might be a convenient cover for produce that
did not and would not exist. The shared expectation of default was written into the
contract as a penalty clause: the seller that defaulted on delivery of goods was
obliged to buy back from the buyer the goods not delivered in the first place at a
premium price – the retail price, which equalled the state procurement price plus
the retail margin.
The result of this was to satisfy most formal plan requirements. The farmer was
reported to have sold produce in planned quantities at plan prices to the state buyer
and could show the false receipt to prove it. The state buyer would be recorded as
having bought the goods at the (low) state buying price and sold the same goods at
the (high) state retail price. There would be two negative signals, however. The state
retail system would be making its profit on fictional sales to the farms, not true sales
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to the population. Farms would show deteriorating balance sheets. Households, in
contrast, would be flush with unspent cash; despite buoyant retail figures, their
tables would be bare.
Case 258 (1960) illustrates this story. Many complaints reached the party
controllers about the procurement of potatoes by the party and state officials of
Ovruch ward, Zhitomir district, in the Ukraine. In 1960, the rural districts of the
western Ukraine were planned to supply 607,000 tons of potatoes to the
industrialized eastern districts. On November 1, short of 147,000 tons, the Ukraine
government decided to allow the plan to be met with storage certificates for
potatoes that would be shipped out the following spring. On November 12, the
Ovruch ward leaders met the local collective farm managers and receipted 2,000
tons of potatoes at 340 rubles per ton (the state buying price), for which the state
procurement office paid them 680,000 rubles. In case of default, however, each
farm would compensate the local procurement office at the retail price of 700 rubles
per ton.
In the spring of 1961, deliveries fell due, but the promised stocks had been
consumed on the farms, so instead the farms paid 1.4 million rubles to the
cooperative procurement office. As a result the farms could show that they had met
the potato supply plan, the procurement office had bought and sold 2,000 tons of
potatoes at the planned margin. The downside was that the farms had lost 720,000
rubles from their balance sheets, while the workers of the eastern Ukraine were
hungry.
Many people must have shared guilty knowledge of this offense. The documents
name five (two party officials, two government officials, and the The party control
investigation documented similar scams that were ongoing in other wards across
Zhitomir district and involving other products (milk and butter). Other related
documents extend allegations to the corruption of local officials and links to
organized crime.
The Carousel (Double-Counting)
In some cases the agricultural procurement plan was met with goods that actually
existed, but went round and round like a carousel. Case 252 (1958) arose from a
complaint by a collective farmer and party member that party and government
officials had conspired with farming and trade managers to execute a carousel fraud
in the Krasnyi kholm ward of Kalinin district.
The 1958 procurement plan for this ward included 38.4 tons of dairy products.
In December of that year the local officials set out to manage a looming shortfall.
They convened 12 farm managers and instructed them to pool their cash and send
out agents to buy up dairy products from retail stores, depots, and warehouses in
Moscow, Leningrad, and neighboring towns. The local government agricultural
inspectorate advised farm accountants that farms would buy dairy products on the
side and not to obstruct cash payments. The consumer union gave passes to farm
representatives to travel by road and rail to do this. The operation yielded 1½ tons
that were duly included in the plan.
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The result was that the plan was fulfilled with dairy products that were sold to
the state twice. As with the IOU scam, the farms suffered financially since they
bought up butter at the state retail price and resold it at the lower state buying price
– but they paid this financial premium, and other transaction costs, willingly to show
compliance with the plan. It was households in the neighboring towns that suffered
a real loss, since butter intended for their tables was diverted to the Krasnyi kholm
operation; consumption was double counted, as well as production. In a related
operation that yielded similar results, one of the local farms was found to have
bought up livestock from its own members for sale to the state. The party
controllers recommended the district party committee to impose reprimands on
those responsible.
While not typical, carousel scams could also be found in industry. Case 270
(1960) involved two Leningrad breweries, “Stepan Razin” (director Konstantinov)
and “Red Bavaria” (Bystrov). Party controllers investigated an unsigned complaint of
deception at both plants. They found that in the course of 1960 Krasnaia Bavariia
had paid Stepan Razin for 1.7 million rubles’ worth of malt, and then resold a similar
quantity back to the seller for a similar sum. Each factory then included the sale in
their plan. (They also engaged in a substitution racket, counting another 900 million
rubles of germinated barley as finished output. These were large scale enterprises
and the impact on fulfillment was small, between one and two percent of each
factory’s quarterly plan, but in each case the false accounting just squeezed them
over 100%.
The contextual reporting makes entertaining reading. Stepan Razin is singled out
as a case of bad management, with excessive overtime, failure to exploit new
equipment, theft, habitual drunkenness at every level from the shop floor to the
manager’s office, losses and breakages in production, serious accidents, discipline
violations, bad working conditions. For the workers living on site, living conditions
were appalling while money for repairs remains unspent. The party controllers
recommended further review with those responsible present.
As a footnote, it is remarkable how enterprises were able to encash money to
execute the IOU and carousel scams. Traditional accounts of the Soviet financial
system (e.g. Garvy 1966) emphasized the separation of anonymous cash from
traceable non-cash bank credits, used to monitor production and trade. In practice,
enterprises and farms were able to encash large sums from institutional bank
deposits when they needed, and the need to fulfil the plan was clearly sufficient.Undetected Crime
Our datasets contain only cases of crimes that were detected. A first question is:
What can we infer about undetected crime? The little that we can establish from our
data is inspired by the literature and first principles.
We will look at two dimensions of undetected crime, the scale of crime and the
scale of criminal networks. We will not be able to reach any strong conclusions. But
we can look for gaps in the data that are suggestive of undetected crimes. These
gaps are consistent with two ideas. One is that detected offenses were the visible tip
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of a vast iceberg of widespread petty offending. The other is that detection was
hindered by criminal networks for which there was an optimal size for concealment.
Did pripiski matter? The Soviet Union was a country of tens of thousands of
enterprises and a hundred million workers. The Soviet-era evidence, reported
earlier, consistently described pripiski as frequent and pervasive – “a system.” Yet,
over twenty years, the files of the KPK accumulated fewer than 200 cases. True,
these were most likely selected out of a much larger number arising at lower levels,
because they had proved difficult to resolve locally. But even the purge of 1946/47,
which raked over evidence dating back to 1943, yielded fewer than 130 cases across
the whole country. If managerial deception was truly widespread, it must be that
most offenses escaped detection.
Can we infer anything about this from our new data? The empirical studies
reviewed earlier are helpful. Suppose Soviet managers were no less honest than the
scientific workers reviewed by Fanelli (2009); then 2% of them would have owned
up to significant fabrication of results but 34%, or seventeen times as many, would
have admitted rounding upward to mislead.8 Put differently, wherever we draw the
line between major and minor offending, and whatever the number of offenses
counted as major and so falling above the line, we should expect to find very many
times that number of minor offenses below it.
Does the distribution of offenses in our data, conditional on detection, match
this predicted distribution of all offenses whether or not detected? The answer is:
Surely not. We already know (from Table 1) that the median offenses in our datasets
were 22 and 16 percent of the plan in cases before the courts and under party
control, respectively. These medians were unquestionably above the line for major
offenses, yet the lesser offenses reported were by definition no more numerous
than offenses of the same or a higher level.
More detail is available in Chart 4, where Panel A shows the court cases, and
Panel B shows the cases taken under party control. In each panel, the horizontal axis
measures the level of offending by the proportion of the plan that was falsified; the
intervals are scaled logarithmically. The vertical axis shows the number of cases that
were detected at each level of offending. In both datasets, very few cases were
detected that involved deception below 4 per cent of the plan: two out of 10 in
Panel A and 3 out of 29 in Panel B.
By inference, at the lower end of the scale of offending, much larger numbers of
offenses were escaping detection than any numbers reported for higher levels.
Other gaps in the data also suggest successful concealment of offending. The
literature maintains that bare-faced lies were vulnerable to exposure. Managers
could create a personal safety zone, however, by maintaining networks of collective
responsibility within which each member would cover for the others. The safety
provided by a network was increasing in scope but diminishing in size. Scope was
beneficial to concealment because buyers and sellers, subordinates and superiors
8 Given that intensive monitoring seems to reduce intrinsic honesty (Schulze and
Frank 2003), our Soviet managers were probably less honest than this.
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could all vouch for each other in their different roles and collude in a consistent
story. Size, in contrast was dangerous because each additional member represented
a heightening of the risk of betrayal. The larger the network, the more difficult it
surely was to introduce newcomers, distribute rents fairly, enforce loyalty, and
screen out potential traitors.
Chart 4. The Distribution of Cases by Level of Deception
Key: Panel A shows cases in the courts, 1946 to 1947, and Panel B shows those
under party control, 1943 to 1962.
Source: Appendixes 1 and 2.
Chart 5. The Distribution of Cases by Size of Network
Key: Panel A shows cases in the courts, 1946 to 1947, and Panel B shows those
under party control, 1943 to 1962.
Source: Appendixes 1 and 2.
Most likely, collusive networks had an optimal size. A network that was too
small would lack the scope to cover infractions. A network that was too large would
tend to unravel under the strain of the prisoner’s dilemma. Given this, what
distribution of offenses should we expect, conditional on detection? We should
expect the distribution to be comprised mainly of two types of offense: those based
on networks either of insufficient scope or excessive size for concealment. And this
is more or less what the data show.
Chart 5 again has two panels. In Panel A, 37 cases with just one or two accused
persons make up three fifths of the 59 total. The next part of the distribution, with
three to five defendants, is underpopulated, with only six cases. Then there is a fat
tail of five cases involving six to 12 defendants. In fact, the distribution is bimodal,
looking as if someone took a bite out of it in the range of three to five persons per
case. This suggests the range in which collusion was relatively effective at
concealment. The distribution in Panel B shows some similarities and contrasts.
There are 39 cases with just one or two accused persons, making up nearly half the
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86 total. The middle segment, with from three to five accused, is thicker than in
Panel A, with 34 cases; the right-hand tail, with 14 cases, is thinner but much longer,
including networks as large as 64 and 76 accused persons. In fact, these 14 cases
involved more than half of all the guilty persons that came under party control.
To summarize, the crime data, although gathered conditional on detection, are
suggestive of undetected offending in two ways. First, the rarity of petty offending in
the data does not mean that petty offending did not occur. More likely, it was
overlooked. Second, offending was more likely to be overlooked when the offenders
were well organized for that purpose, and this required a criminal association large
enough to cover but not so large as to risk defection.Crime and Punishment
Not all offenses that were detected were treated as crimes; evidently, most were
filed as mere violations of the administrative order. Given that an offense was
detected, what divided criminals from violators? Specifically, did value to the party
inhibit criminalization of the offense? Here the data provide us with a somewhat
poorly controlled experiment. The court records show us a set of cases that were
taken to court and harshly punished over the period of a campaign; the party control
records show us cases at the previous stage of investigation, when party
accountability had to be established, over a much longer period.
One salient difference between the two datasets featured in Table 1 is
geographical. Cases prosecuted in the courts after the war were on average more
than 1,600 kilometers distant from Moscow – as far away as Makhachkala, the
capital city of Dagestan. Those investigated within the party averaged a bare 800
kilometers from Moscow, along a ring that passed (for illustration) through the city
of Kirov. To give context, the average citizen registered in the USSR population
census of 1959 lived somewhere between these two rings, on a circle 1,350
kilometers of Moscow that ran, for example, through Karaganda in northwestern
Kazakhstan.
To pick out the grain of this difference, I divided the 1959 Soviet population into
deciles by distance from Moscow of the provincial (oblast, krai, or autonomous
republic) centre with which the census associated them, and calculated the over- or
underrepresentation of each decile in the two datasets. Chart 6 shows the result.
The horizontal axis measures the distance intervals inhabited by each decile. The
vertical axis measures proportional representativeness. The columns are darker for
court cases and lighter for cases under party control.
While there is a certain amount of visible noise, most striking are the positions
of Moscow and its surrounding districts, the two inner deciles, which contributed
half the cases under party control, yet almost no court cases; and the vast, sparsely
settled territory from the Urals through Central Asia and Siberia, the outer eighth
and ninth deciles, which contributed half the court cases. As far as judicial
repression is concerned, the implication is obvious, Connectedness mattered. Those
that lived within a day’s drive of the capital would not be required to go to court.
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Above, Table 1 captured another aspect of connectedness by showing that
seniority brought judicial impunity. Superior officials in the party and ministerial
hierarchies were almost never brought to court. In contrast, cases under party
control regularly cited such officials for guilty knowledge of pripiski, and sometimes
for having instigated them.
Chart 6 shows that those in proximity to Moscow were much more likely to be
called upon to answer to the party. By implication, the connectedness of whistle
blowers mattered too. If you lived in Iaroslavl’, it made sense to mail a letter to
Moscow 250 kilometers away to expose local malfeasance. If you lived in Iakutsk
(4,900 kilometers), you didn’t bother.
When managers were brought to court, what risks did they face? Repression in
1946/47 was savage. Nearly all those convicted were sentenced to long terms of
imprisonment, and a few were shot. The judicial authorities in Moscow marked out
cases where local courts imposed lighter or suspended penalties for criticism and
sometimes appeal for a heavier sentence.
Chart 6. Representativeness of USSR Population of 1959 by Distance from Moscow in
Kilometers
Source: Court and party control cases are those listed in Appendices 1 and 2. For
regional populations and distances, based on the 1959 USSR census, see Appendix 4.
Charts 7 to 9 show what how the heaviest sentence imposed in each case can be
related to the case’s measurable characteristics. There are many missing
observations and only three are common to all three charts. Chart 7 shows that
sentences were increasing in the size of the criminal network before the court. Chart
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8 shows that sentencing bore little relationship to the public loss, measured by plan
inflation, but Chart 9 suggests (with one outlier) a tendency to raise the penalty
where private gains (usually illegal bonuses, but sometimes bribes too) were larger.
Chart 7. Highest Penalty and Number of Accused in Court, 1946/47
Note: In 1947 the Soviet Union temporarily replaced the death penalty with 25
years’ imprisonment, and that is how executions are represented in this chart.
Source: As Appendix 1.
Chart 8. Highest Penalty in Court and Plan Shortfall, 1946/47
Source: Appendix 1.
The cases taken under party control show a contrast. Party controllers could
endorse, impose, or recommend penalties under the aegis of the party, the
employer, the judicial authorities, or all three. The worst party penalty was
expulsion, which brought loss of career and could be a prelude to prosecution. The
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worst administrative penalty was to be dismissed “from the system” which meant
that the ministerial employer took no responsibility for finding the defaulter another
position; otherwise, “dismissal” generally meant nothing worse than transfer and
demotion. The worst judicial recommendation was for the documents to be turned
over to the prosecutors, which could lead to imprisonment or worse.
Chart 9. Highest Penalty in Court and Private Gain, 1946/47
Note: In 1947 the Soviet Union temporarily replaced the death penalty with 25
years’ imprisonment, and that is how executions are represented in this chart.
Source: As Appendix 1.
Table 3. Cases Investigated by Party Control: Highest Penalty Imposed
Number of cases
Party penalty:
Criticism or reprimand 30
Demotion or dismissal 14
Expulsion 4
Not stated 5
Ministerial penalty:
Criticism or reprimand 7
Demotion or dismissal 19
Dismissal from system 2
Not stated 30
Judicial penalty:
Investigation 8
Prosecution 2
No information 16
Source: Appendix 2. Totals exceed the total of cases because penalties could be set
under more than one heading.
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Table 3 summarizes the highest penalty under each heading that was set in each
case taken under party control. Under every heading the most severe penalties were
applied in a small minority of cases: four ended in expulsion from the party, two
ended in dismissal from the system, and 10 were prosecuted or recommended for
the prosecutor’s attention. In fact, nearly all cases were settled by a reprimand or
demotion.
Superficially there is a paradox. False accounting, when prosecuted with the full
rigour of the law, could be penalized at the same level as homicide or treason. Yet in
the absence of some political imperative to impose this, penalization was normally
light. Here it is possible to see something more specific than the general failure of
commitment suggested by the literature. Pripiski involved rule breaking and
conspiracy. A dictator with complete confidence in the correctness of his own
decisions would always see this as a crime of disloyalty. After Stalin, however, Soviet
leaders knew they could make mistakes in their own decisions. If a plan could be
mistaken, the first-best solution was to correct the mistake, for example, by
reducing an infeasible plan. If mistakes were not easily acknowledged, however,
pripiski might not be such a bad thing. If the plan was excessive, the second-best
solution might well be for the manager to lie and for others to collude. This would
save the face of the dictator, who did not have to own up to a mistake. It would also
avoid the social costs of maintaining society in the permanent state of mobilization
and overstrain required to fulfill every plan at any price.9
The reluctance of party controllers and prosecutors to pursue offenders speaks
loudly from many documents. When party controllers found that a case had already
been dealt with under party or administrative sanctions, they hastened to close the
file without further action. Reasons given by prosecutors for failure to pursue
charges in cases arising in 1948/49 (those listed in Appendix 3) are also revealing.
Case 402, involving an illegal bonus of 40,000 rubles, was dropped because the
managers had left the factory; case 403, involving fictional construction work of
nearly 70,000 rubles, was abandoned because the high rate of project management
turnover made culpability hard to pin down. In case 405 charges were initially
dropped on the grounds of a first offense, and resumed only after a higher level
review. Case 407, dated October 1949, involved three managers of Azovstal’, one of
the Soviet Union’s great steel factories, who had secured the payment of nearly
130,000 rubles of illegal bonuses, including thousands personally to themselves, but
the prosecutors waived charges in view of party reprimands and promises of
restitution. Three years earlier, men had been shot for less. Truly, the gunfire
weakened as the target became more prominent.
9 The complicity of Soviet leaders in lying about results was expressed in a well
known anecdote of later years (Lewis 2008). A train is carrying Lenin, Stalin,
Khrushchev, and Brezhnev. The train stops and won’t move; each has a proposal.
Lenin: mobilize some volunteers to get the train moving. Stalin: shoot the driver.
Khrushchev: take up the track behind the train and lay it in front. Brezhnev: draw
the curtains, play music, and pretend the train is moving.
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Only in two cases (401 and 406) were the defendants taken to court. In the first
of these the pripiski were just an incidental cover for wholesale asset stripping and
resale: the factory had essentially fallen into the hands of a gang of thieves that
robbed it before escaping into the underworld.Implications
The picture of management behavior that we draw from these records is rational in
the short run. Managers had many objectives, but most of these depended on
reporting fulfillment of the plan. To report fulfillment they had to optimize over
several margins simultaneously.
Chart 10 provides a simple illustration of optimization over two margins, the
margins of truth and effort. Real output is costly, requiring outlays of productive
capital and effort. The line sloping upward from the origin is the marginal cost of real
output. The plan for real output is π. Without the opportunity to lie, the manager
must incur marginal cost c'1. Like production, lying requires outlays of capital (social,
not productive) and effort. The marginal cost of lying is shown by the line that slopes
upward to the left, starting from π. The intersection of the two marginal cost curves
shows the combination of true and false output that minimizes total costs. Marginal
costs are lower at c'2 and total costs are less than if only truth is told.
Chart 10. Rational Managers
Note: in equilibrium, fictional output λ = π – x*.
This model has simple implications. The rational manager always lies in some
degree. The comparative statics are that an increase in plan tension raises real and
fictional output simultaneously. An adverse technology shock, on the other hand,
reduces real output and raises fictional output. Farmers caught out by harvest
difficulties late in the season, for example, could often meet the plan only by lying.
This framework could be extended to include other margins, including time, and
so dynamic effects. Over time, the rational manager’s first priority was to secure a
lower plan before setting both effort and the optimal lie. This has a clear reflection
in the party control data: despite generous rewards for plan overfulfillment,
Marginal cost
Reported output
π
c'(x)c'(λ)
x*
x real output
π planned output
λ fictional output
c'1
c'2
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managers that made false claims rarely went more than one or two percent above
the plan. Across 16 cases where this figure is given, the minimum report was 100%
and the median report was 100.9%. Their modesty is best understood in a dynamic
setting in which managers were trying to lower planners’ expectations (and so
future plans) at the same time that planners tried to lift performance. Introducing a
time dimension leaves the principles of our model unchanged, however.
Some features of the data, however, are poorly explained in terms of classical
optimization. One is the wave-like motion of the time series that we have, shown in
Chart 2. By itself, this pattern is hard to evaluate; as I wrote above, we cannot clearly
separate time variation in the propensity of detection from that of offending. It
leaves the impression, however, that false accounting came in waves. Another
unexplained aspect is equally impressionistic, harder to convey, and impossible to
quantify, but jumps out at the reader from many of the crime narratives in the
documentation: the sense that in many cases the scale of offenses and the scope of
networks mushroomed far beyond anything that could have seemed rational either
before or after the event. The largest conspiracy in our data (Case 268, in the Zubova
Poliana ward of the Mordovian autonomous republic in 1960), was an IOU and
carousel fraud involving hundreds of livestock, thousands of tons of dairy products,
and almost a million eggs. When we count up all those that shared guilty knowledge,
we find a total of 76 people including 39 farm managers, 24 local government and
party officials, and 13 buying agents.
When they were breaking so many rules, and when so many people knew about
it, how could they possibly have expected to escape detection and its
consequences? What on earth were they thinking about? As one reads, one cannot
avoid the conclusion that offending was sometimes so blatant, and was known
about by so many, that detection was absolutely inevitable. Then why did they set
out on a course guaranteed to fail? In some minor cases, most likely, the culprit was
not very clever or failed to take elementary precautions; this must apply where the
guilty party acted alone or nearly alone. In a few cases the culprit may have
maximized some short-run gain and then made a run for it. But these cannot apply
to most stories told here, and especially not to those where pripiski involved large
networks that were established to defend reputations and advance careers.
In such cases a cognitive failure to evaluate the true risks of criminal behavior is
the most straightforward hypothesis. When cases involved many conspirators, and
particularly when conspirators followed practices that were known to be already
prevalent in neighboring factories or districts, risks may have seemed to be reduced
by perceived safety in numbers, or because perpetrators were engaging in following
(or conformist) behavior in ethical norms-setting.
Another factor in the underestimation of risks associated with false accounting,
specific to this period, may have been declining real volatility of the economy, which
encouraged unjustified trust in false claims of real growth. Chart 11 shows that, with
the 1950s, Soviet managers’ macroeconomic environment entered a period of
stability unprecedented since the 1920s.
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Chart 11: Real GDP Volatility in the USSR, 1928 to 1962
Sources: Soviet GDP, 1928 to 1939 and 1946 to 1962 from Moorsteen and Powell
(1966, pp. 622-4); 1940 to 1945 from Harrison (1996, p. 92).
While perceived risks of false accounting were in decline, true risks were surely
increasing in both the numbers of conspirators and in numbers of cases – maybe at
an increasing rate. One increasing risk was that, out of growing numbers of
conspirators, at least one would blow the whistle. Another was the risk that
correlated rule breaking would have observable aggregate consequences. A few
inflated claims might be lost in the general noise of good and bad luck. Many such
claims, however, made at the same time, were more likely to be exposed by supply
breakdowns and consumer protests. Exposure was particularly likely to follow when
a sector (such as agriculture) suffered an aggregate technology or plan shock.
In short, cheating was not “equal”. We could think of the frequency of pripiski as
time-varying under the influence of imitative behavior with aggregate effects that
showed up in periodic overvaluation of plan reports – an asset price bubble, where
the asset being traded, and periodically overpriced, was interpersonal trust.
The events of 1960 are consistent with the bursting of such a bubble. In the late
1950s, Nikita Khrushchev set about trying to put more meat on the tables of Soviet
consumers. Regional party leaders rose to his challenge, none with greater
enthusiasm than Aleksei Larionov, first secretary of the agricultural district of Riazan,
less than 200 kilometers from Moscow (Khlevniuk forthcoming). Building what
appeared to be a brilliant career, Larionov made overambitious promises, which
Khrushchev took at face value and endorsed in public. Other regional leaders
followed Larionov’s lead. Promises on such a scale could not be kept, and their
collapse was made more certain by their being made simultaneously; for example,
one province could buy up meat from its neighbors to fulfil the plan, but not all
could do this at the same time.
The Riazan affair ended badly with a public scandal, suicide for Larionov,
reprimands for many, arrests and dismissals for a few, and long remembered
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grudges against Khrushchev himself for the overextension of political credit that
made the whole affair possible. In fact, the bursting of the bubble brought a political
credit crunch. It threw sand in the Soviet transactions mechanism, which ground to a
halt. Toxic assets had to be identified, and then liquidated – quickly. Only after that
could normal business be carefully resumed.Conclusions
In this paper I have introduced new data on false accounting in the Soviet enterprise
in the 1940s and 1950s. These support four main conclusions.
First, the evidence of detected crimes is consistent with a background of
undetected offending that was pervasive but low-level. Conspiratorial networks may
have had an optimal size to avoid detection. Second, while false accounting broke
the law, the authorities had difficulty in committing to criminalize it; it was normal
for offenses that were detected to be punished leniently by the use of
administrative or party reprimands, without reference to the courts. Third, leniency
seems to have been exercised disproportionately on behalf of politically connected
offenders, even during crackdowns, and perhaps especially then.
Fourth, the empirical pattern suggests short-run optimizing by managers with
the intermediate objective of fulfilling the plan. In the medium run, however, we see
a socialist asset price bubble developing, where the asset was interpersonal trust.
Cheating was not equal. False accounting was subject to herd effects, leading to
correlated risk taking. The result was periodic overinvestments in trust, followed by
market collapse when the bubble burst.Published References
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Cases 101 to 159 are taken from the files of the USSR Ministry of Justice held on
microfilm by the Hoover Archive (GARF, fond R-9492, opis 1a, file 495), as follows.
The accused are named first, then the reference is listed, followed by the document
title and date.
101. Zavarnitsina and others. Folios 2-2ob: RSFSR Minister of Justice Basavin, "Ob usilenie bor'by s pripiskami v
otchetakh o vypolenenii proizvodstvennykh planov po RSFSR za fevral' mesiats 1947 goda,” to USSR
Minister of Justice Rychkov (Apr. 1, 1947).
102. Plylov and others. Folios 2-2ob: RSFSR Minister of Justice Basavin, "Ob usilenie bor'by s pripiskami v
otchetakh o vypolenenii proizvodstvennykh planov po RSFSR za fevral' mesiats 1947 goda,” to USSR
Minister of Justice Rychkov (Apr. 1, 1947).
103. Ishnazarov. Folio 3: Uzbek SSR Minister of Justice V. Umarov, memorandum to USSR Minister of Justice
Rychkov (Apr. 2, 1947).
104. Sergeev. Folio 4: Kazakh Minister of Justice M. Nurbaev, "O vypolnenii direktivnogo pis'ma Miu Soiuza
SSR ot 23/VII-46 g. No. 18/32 s "Ob usilenie bor'by s pripiskami v otchetakh o vypolenenii
proizvodstvennykh planov",” to USSR Minister of Justice Rychkov (Apr. 9, 1947).
105. Diuisekov. Folio 4: Kazakh Minister of Justice M. Nurbaev, "O vypolnenii direktivnogo pis'ma Miu Soiuza
SSR ot 23/VII-46 g. No. 18/32 s "Ob usilenie bor'by s pripiskami v otchetakh o vypolenenii
proizvodstvennykh planov",” to USSR Minister of Justice Rychkov (Apr. 9, 1947).
106. Savitskii and others. Folios 5-5ob: RSFSR Ministry of Justice, chief of Leningrad administration (name not
clear), "O pripiskakh k gosudarstvennoi otchetnosti predpriiatii po vypolneniiu proizvodstevennykh
planov,” to USSR Minister of Justice Rychkov and RSFSR Minister of Justice Basavin (Apr. 20, 1947).
107. Bam and others. Folios 5-5ob: RSFSR Ministry of Justice, chief of Leningrad administration (name not
clear), "O pripiskakh k gosudarstvennoi otchetnosti predpriiatii po vypolneniiu proizvodstevennykh
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planov,” to USSR Minister of Justice Rychkov and RSFSR Minister of Justice Basavin (Apr. 20, 1947). Folios
32-32ob: RSFSR Minister of Justice Basavin, "Ob usilenie bor'by s pripiskami v otchetakh o vypolenenii
proizvodstvennykh planov po RSFSR za mart mesiats 1947 goda,” to USSR Minister of Justice Rychkov
(May 21, 1947).
108. Fedorov. Folio 6: Azerbaidzhan SSR Minister of Justice S. Alimamedov, memorandum to USSR Minister of
Justice Rychkov (Dec. 2, 1946). Folios 35-43: USSR Ministry of Justice, inspector of general courts
Chugunov, "Obobshchenie sudeb'noi praktiki po delam o pripiskakh k gosudarstvennoi otchetnosti po
vypolneniiu planov” (April 1947).
109. Piateriia and others. Folio 6: S. Azerbaidzhan SSR Minister of Justice S. Alimamedov, memorandum to
USSR Minister of Justice Rychkov (Dec. 2, 1946). Folios 35-43: USSR Ministry of Justice, inspector of
general courts Chugunov, "Obobshchenie sudeb'noi praktiki po delam o pripiskakh k gosudarstvennoi
otchetnosti po vypolneniiu planov” (April 1947).
110. Grishchuk and others. Folios 9-10ob: RSFSR Minister of Justice Basavin, "Ob usilenie bor'by s pripiskami v
otchetakh o vypolenenii proizvodstvennykh planov po RSFSR za oktiabr' mesiats 1946 goda,” to USSR
Minister of Justice Rychkov (Dec. 20, 1946). Folios 35-43: USSR Ministry of Justice, inspector of general
courts Chugunov, "Obobshchenie sudeb'noi praktiki po delam o pripiskakh k gosudarstvennoi otchetnosti
po vypolneniiu planov” (April 1947).
111. Agapov and others. Folios 9-10ob: RSFSR Minister of Justice Basavin, "Ob usilenie bor'by s pripiskami v
otchetakh o vypolenenii proizvodstvennykh planov po RSFSR za oktiabr' mesiats 1946 goda,” to USSR
Minister of Justice Rychkov (Dec. 20, 1946). Folios 35-43: USSR Ministry of Justice, inspector of general
courts Chugunov, "Obobshchenie sudeb'noi praktiki po delam o pripiskakh k gosudarstvennoi otchetnosti
po vypolneniiu planov” (April 1947).
112. Furkin and others. Folios 9-10ob: RSFSR Minister of Justice Basavin, "Ob usilenie bor'by s pripiskami v
otchetakh o vypolenenii proizvodstvennykh planov po RSFSR za oktiabr' mesiats 1946 goda,” to USSR
Minister of Justice Rychkov (Dec. 20, 1946). Folios 35-43: USSR Ministry of Justice, inspector of general
courts Chugunov, "Obobshchenie sudeb'noi praktiki po delam o pripiskakh k gosudarstvennoi otchetnosti
po vypolneniiu planov” (April 1947).
113. Bredekhin and others. Folios 9-10ob: RSFSR Minister of Justice Basavin, "Ob usilenie bor'by s pripiskami v
otchetakh o vypolenenii proizvodstvennykh planov po RSFSR za oktiabr' mesiats 1946 goda,” to USSR
Minister of Justice Rychkov (Dec. 20, 1946). Folios 35-43: USSR Ministry of Justice, inspector of general
courts Chugunov, "Obobshchenie sudeb'noi praktiki po delam o pripiskakh k gosudarstvennoi otchetnosti
po vypolneniiu planov” (April 1947).
114. Nikitin and others. Folios 9-10ob: RSFSR Minister of Justice Basavin, "Ob usilenie bor'by s pripiskami v
otchetakh o vypolenenii proizvodstvennykh planov po RSFSR za oktiabr' mesiats 1946 goda,” to USSR
Minister of Justice Rychkov (Dec. 20, 1946). Folios 35-43: USSR Ministry of Justice, inspector of general
courts Chugunov, "Obobshchenie sudeb'noi praktiki po delam o pripiskakh k gosudarstvennoi otchetnosti
po vypolneniiu planov” (April 1947).
115. Martynov and others. Folios 9-10ob: RSFSR Minister of Justice Basavin, "Ob usilenie bor'by s pripiskami v
otchetakh o vypolenenii proizvodstvennykh planov po RSFSR za oktiabr' mesiats 1946 goda,” to USSR
Minister of Justice Rychkov (Dec. 20, 1946). Folios 35-43: USSR Ministry of Justice, inspector of general
courts Chugunov, "Obobshchenie sudeb'noi praktiki po delam o pripiskakh k gosudarstvennoi otchetnosti
po vypolneniiu planov” (April 1947).
116. Rybakov and others. Folios 9-10ob: RSFSR Minister of Justice Basavin, "Ob usilenie bor'by s pripiskami v
otchetakh o vypolenenii proizvodstvennykh planov po RSFSR za oktiabr' mesiats 1946 goda,” to USSR
Minister of Justice Rychkov (Dec. 20, 1946). Folios 35-43: USSR Ministry of Justice, inspector of general
courts Chugunov, "Obobshchenie sudeb'noi praktiki po delam o pripiskakh k gosudarstvennoi otchetnosti
po vypolneniiu planov” (April 1947).
117. Astashkin and others. Folios 9-10ob: RSFSR Minister of Justice Basavin, "Ob usilenie bor'by s pripiskami v
otchetakh o vypolenenii proizvodstvennykh planov po RSFSR za oktiabr' mesiats 1946 goda,” to USSR
Minister of Justice Rychkov (Dec. 20, 1946).
118. Ugarov and others. Folios 9-10ob: RSFSR Minister of Justice Basavin, "Ob usilenie bor'by s pripiskami v
otchetakh o vypolenenii proizvodstvennykh planov po RSFSR za oktiabr' mesiats 1946 goda,” to USSR
Minister of Justice Rychkov (Dec. 20, 1946).
119. Alimatov. Folios 11-16: Uzbek SSR Minister of Justice Kamilov, "O rabote sudov UzSSR po delam
sviazannym s pripiskami v otchetakh o vypolnenii proizvodstvennykh planov po sostoianiiu na 1.XII. 46
goda,” to USSR Minister of Justice Rychkov (Dec. 12, 1946). Folios 35-43: USSR Ministry of Justice,
inspector of general courts Chugunov, "Obobshchenie sudeb'noi praktiki po delam o pripiskakh k
gosudarstvennoi otchetnosti po vypolneniiu planov” (April 1947).
120. Abubakirov and others. Folios 11-16: Uzbek SSR Minister of Justice Kamilov, "O rabote sudov UzSSR po
delam sviazannym s pripiskami v otchetakh o vypolnenii proizvodstvennykh planov po sostoianiiu na
1.XII. 46 goda,” to USSR Minister of Justice Rychkov (Dec. 12, 1946).
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121. Burnashev and others. Folios 11-16: Uzbek SSR Minister of Justice Kamilov, "O rabote sudov UzSSR po
delam sviazannym s pripiskami v otchetakh o vypolnenii proizvodstvennykh planov po sostoianiiu na
1.XII. 46 goda,” to USSR Minister of Justice Rychkov (Dec. 12, 1946). Folios 35-43: USSR Ministry of
Justice, inspector of general courts Chugunov, "Obobshchenie sudeb'noi praktiki po delam o pripiskakh k
gosudarstvennoi otchetnosti po vypolneniiu planov” (April 1947).
122. Collective farmer Khalikov and others. Folios 11-16: Uzbek SSR Minister of Justice Kamilov, "O rabote
sudov UzSSR po delam sviazannym s pripiskami v otchetakh o vypolnenii proizvodstvennykh planov po
sostoianiiu na 1.XII. 46 goda,” to USSR Minister of Justice Rychkov (Dec. 12, 1946).
123. Buyer Khalikov and others. Folios 11-16: Uzbek SSR Minister of Justice Kamilov, "O rabote sudov UzSSR
po delam sviazannym s pripiskami v otchetakh o vypolnenii proizvodstvennykh planov po sostoianiiu na
1.XII. 46 goda,” to USSR Minister of Justice Rychkov (Dec. 12, 1946). Folios 35-43: USSR Ministry of
Justice, inspector of general courts Chugunov, "Obobshchenie sudeb'noi praktiki po delam o pripiskakh k
gosudarstvennoi otchetnosti po vypolneniiu planov” (April 1947).
124. Gambarian. Folios 17-18: Azerbaidzhan SSR Deputy Minister of Justice Guseinov, memorandum to, USSR
Deputy Minister of Justice Rubichev (Jan. 6, 1947).
125. Ataian and others. Folios 17-18: Azerbaidzhan SSR Deputy Minister of Justice Guseinov, memorandum to
USSR Deputy Minister of Justice Rubichev (Jan. 6, 1947).
126. Melikov and others. Folios 17-18: Azerbaidzhan SSR Deputy Minister of Justice Guseinov, memorandum
to USSR Deputy Minister of Justice Rubichev (Jan. 6, 1947).
127. Karchmachin and others. Folio 20: RSFSR Ministry of Justice, chief of Leningrad administration Averin,
memorandum to USSR Minister of Justice Rychkov and RSFSR Minister of Justice Basavin (Jan. 15, 1947).
Folios 27-27ob: RSFSR Deputy Minister of Justice Perlov, "Ob usilenie bor'by s pripiskami v otchetakh o
vypolenenii proizvodstvennykh planov po RSFSR za dekabr' mesiats 1946 goda,” to USSR Minister of
Justice Rychkov and RSFSR Minister of Justice Basavin (Feb. 14, 1947). Folios 35-43: USSR Ministry of
Justice, inspector of general courts Chugunov, "Obobshchenie sudeb'noi praktiki po delam o pripiskakh k
gosudarstvennoi otchetnosti po vypolneniiu planov” (April 1947).
128. Denisevich. Folio 21: Belorussian SSR Minister of Justice (name not clear), memorandum to USSR Minister
of Justice Rychkov and RSFSR Minister of Justice Basavin (Jan. 21, 1947). Folios 35-43: USSR Ministry of
Justice, inspector of general courts Chugunov, "Obobshchenie sudeb'noi praktiki po delam o pripiskakh k
gosudarstvennoi otchetnosti po vypolneniiu planov” (April 1947).
129. Tkachuk. Folio 22: Ukraine SSR Deputy Minister of Justice Voronov, "Spetsdonesenie po delam o
pripiskakh k gosotchetnosti za dekabr' 1946 g.,” to USSR Minister of Justice Rychkov and RSFSR Minister
of Justice Basavin (Jan. 27, 1947).
130. Efimov. Folios 23-24: Turkmen SSR Minister of Justice Karadzhaev, "O rasmotrenii sudami Turkmenskoi
SSR del sviazannykh s pripiskami v otchetakh v otchetakh (sic) o vypolnenii proizvodstvennykh planov za
oktiabr', noiabr' i dekabr' 1946 g.,” to USSR Minister of Justice Rychkov and RSFSR Minister of Justice
Basavin (Jan. 29, 1947).
131. Artsebashev. Folios 23-24: Turkmen SSR Minister of Justice Karadzhaev, "O rasmotrenii sudami
Turkmenskoi SSR del sviazannykh s pripiskami v otchetakh v otchetakh (sic) o vypolnenii
proizvodstvennykh planov za oktiabr', noiabr' i dekabr' 1946 g.,” to USSR Minister of Justice Rychkov and
RSFSR Minister of Justice Basavin (Jan. 29, 1947).
132. Karamanov and others. Folios 23-24: Turkmen SSR Minister of Justice Karadzhaev, "O rasmotrenii sudami
Turkmenskoi SSR del sviazannykh s pripiskami v otchetakh v otchetakh (sic) o vypolnenii
proizvodstvennykh planov za oktiabr', noiabr' i dekabr' 1946 g.,” to USSR Minister of Justice Rychkov and
RSFSR Minister of Justice Basavin (Jan. 29, 1947). Folios 35-43: USSR Ministry of Justice, inspector of
general courts Chugunov, "Obobshchenie sudeb'noi praktiki po delam o pripiskakh k gosudarstvennoi
otchetnosti po vypolneniiu planov” (April 1947).
133. Khodzhakuliev and others. Folios 23-24: Turkmen SSR Minister of Justice Karadzhaev, "O rasmotrenii
sudami Turkmenskoi SSR del sviazannykh s pripiskami v otchetakh v otchetakh (sic) o vypolnenii
proizvodstvennykh planov za oktiabr', noiabr' i dekabr' 1946 g.,” to USSR Minister of Justice Rychkov and
RSFSR Minister of Justice Basavin (Jan. 29, 1947). Folios 35-43: USSR Ministry of Justice, inspector of
general courts Chugunov, "Obobshchenie sudeb'noi praktiki po delam o pripiskakh k gosudarstvennoi
otchetnosti po vypolneniiu planov” (April 1947).
134. Nurburdyev and others. Folios 23-24: Turkmen SSR Minister of Justice Karadzhaev, "O rasmotrenii sudami
Turkmenskoi SSR del sviazannykh s pripiskami v otchetakh v otchetakh (sic) o vypolnenii
proizvodstvennykh planov za oktiabr', noiabr' i dekabr' 1946 g.,” to USSR Minister of Justice Rychkov and
RSFSR Minister of Justice Basavin (Jan. 29, 1947).
135. Kroshechkin. Folios 25-26: RSFSR deputy minister of justice Perlov, "Ob usilenie bor'by s pripiskami v
otchetakh o vypolenenii proizvodstvennykh planov po RSFSR za noiabr' mesiats 1946 goda,” to USSR
Minister of Justice Rychkov and RSFSR Minister of Justice Basavin (Feb. 8, 1947). Folios 35-43: USSR
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Ministry of Justice, inspector of general courts Chugunov, "Obobshchenie sudeb'noi praktiki po delam o
pripiskakh k gosudarstvennoi otchetnosti po vypolneniiu planov” (April 1947).
136. Beliad'ko. Folios 25-26: RSFSR deputy minister of justice Perlov, "Ob usilenie bor'by s pripiskami v
otchetakh o vypolenenii proizvodstvennykh planov po RSFSR za noiabr' mesiats 1946 goda,” to USSR
Minister of Justice Rychkov and RSFSR Minister of Justice Basavin (Feb. 8, 1947). Folios 35-43: USSR
Ministry of Justice, inspector of general courts Chugunov, "Obobshchenie sudeb'noi praktiki po delam o
pripiskakh k gosudarstvennoi otchetnosti po vypolneniiu planov” (April 1947).
137. Chernikov. Folios 25-26: RSFSR deputy minister of justice Perlov, "Ob usilenie bor'by s pripiskami v
otchetakh o vypolenenii proizvodstvennykh planov po RSFSR za noiabr' mesiats 1946 goda,” to USSR
Minister of Justice Rychkov and RSFSR Minister of Justice Basavin (Feb. 8, 1947).
138. Shurovskii and others. Folios 25-26: RSFSR deputy minister of justice Perlov, "Ob usilenie bor'by s
pripiskami v otchetakh o vypolenenii proizvodstvennykh planov po RSFSR za noiabr' mesiats 1946 goda,”
to USSR Minister of Justice Rychkov and RSFSR Minister of Justice Basavin (Feb. 8, 1947).
139. Frolov and others. Folios 25-26: RSFSR deputy minister of justice Perlov, "Ob usilenie bor'by s pripiskami v
otchetakh o vypolenenii proizvodstvennykh planov po RSFSR za noiabr' mesiats 1946 goda,” to USSR
Minister of Justice Rychkov and RSFSR Minister of Justice Basavin (Feb. 8, 1947). Folios 35-43: USSR
Ministry of Justice, inspector of general courts Chugunov, "Obobshchenie sudeb'noi praktiki po delam o
pripiskakh k gosudarstvennoi otchetnosti po vypolneniiu planov” (April 1947).
140. Falakiants and others. Folios 25-26: RSFSR deputy minister of justice Perlov, "Ob usilenie bor'by s
pripiskami v otchetakh o vypolenenii proizvodstvennykh planov po RSFSR za noiabr' mesiats 1946 goda,”
to USSR Minister of Justice Rychkov and RSFSR Minister of Justice Basavin (Feb. 8, 1947).
141. Sevost'ianov and others. Folios 25-26: RSFSR deputy minister of justice Perlov, "Ob usilenie bor'by s
pripiskami v otchetakh o vypolenenii proizvodstvennykh planov po RSFSR za noiabr' mesiats 1946 goda,”
to USSR Minister of Justice Rychkov and RSFSR Minister of Justice Basavin (Feb. 8, 1947). Folios 35-43:
USSR Ministry of Justice, inspector of general courts Chugunov, "Obobshchenie sudeb'noi praktiki po
delam o pripiskakh k gosudarstvennoi otchetnosti po vypolneniiu planov” (April 1947).
142. Ostrovernin and others. Folios 27-27ob: RSFSR deputy minister of justice Perlov, "Ob usilenie bor'by s
pripiskami v otchetakh o vypolenenii proizvodstvennykh planov po RSFSR za dekabr' mesiats 1946 goda,”
to USSR Minister of Justice Rychkov and RSFSR Minister of Justice Basavin (Feb. 14, 1947). Folios 35-43:
USSR Ministry of Justice, inspector of general courts Chugunov, "Obobshchenie sudeb'noi praktiki po
delam o pripiskakh k gosudarstvennoi otchetnosti po vypolneniiu planov” (April 1947).
143. Zalesskaia and others. Folios 27-27ob: RSFSR deputy minister of justice Perlov, "Ob usilenie bor'by s
pripiskami v otchetakh o vypolenenii proizvodstvennykh planov po RSFSR za dekabr' mesiats 1946 goda,”
to USSR Minister of Justice Rychkov and RSFSR Minister of Justice Basavin (Feb. 14, 1947).
144. Avgustinchik. Folio 28: RSFSR Ministry of Justice, chief of Leningrad administration Averin, memorandum
to USSR Minister of Justice Rychkov and RSFSR Minister of Justice Basavin (Feb. 14, 1947).
145. Karpuk. Folio 29: Belorussian SSR Minister of Justice (name not clear), memorandum to USSR Minister of
Justice Rychkov (Feb. 27, 1947). Folios 35-43: USSR Ministry of Justice, inspector of general courts
Chugunov, "Obobshchenie sudeb'noi praktiki po delam o pripiskakh k gosudarstvennoi otchetnosti po
vypolneniiu planov” (April 1947).
146. Lukichev and others. Folios 30-30ob: RSFSR Minister of Justice Basavin, "Ob usilenie bor'by s pripiskami v
otchetakh o vypolenenii proizvodstvennykh planov po RSFSR za ianvar' mesiats 1947 goda,” to USSR
Minister of Justice Rychkov (Mar. 10, 1947). Folios 35-43: USSR Ministry of Justice, inspector of general
courts Chugunov, "Obobshchenie sudeb'noi praktiki po delam o pripiskakh k gosudarstvennoi otchetnosti
po vypolneniiu planov” (April 1947).
147. Parshukov and others. Folios 30-30ob: RSFSR Minister of Justice Basavin, "Ob usilenie bor'by s pripiskami
v otchetakh o vypolenenii proizvodstvennykh planov po RSFSR za ianvar' mesiats 1947 goda,” to USSR
Minister of Justice Rychkov (Mar. 10, 1947). Folios 35-43: USSR Ministry of Justice, inspector of general
courts Chugunov, "Obobshchenie sudeb'noi praktiki po delam o pripiskakh k gosudarstvennoi otchetnosti
po vypolneniiu planov” (April 1947).
148. Beliankin and others. Folios 30-30ob: RSFSR Minister of Justice Basavin, "Ob usilenie bor'by s pripiskami v
otchetakh o vypolenenii proizvodstvennykh planov po RSFSR za ianvar' mesiats 1947 goda,” to USSR
Minister of Justice Rychkov (Mar. 10, 1947).
149. Smirnov and others. Folios 31-31ob: RSFSR Ministry of Justice, chief of Leningrad administration Averin,
"O pripiskakh k gosudarstvennoi otchetnosti predpriiatii po vypolneniiu proizvodstvennykh planov,” to
USSR Minister of Justice Rychkov and RSFSR Minister of Justice Basavin (Mar. 13, 1947).
150. Murashov and others. Folios 31-31ob: RSFSR Ministry of Justice, chief of Leningrad administration Averin,
"O pripiskakh k gosudarstvennoi otchetnosti predpriiatii po vypolneniiu proizvodstvennykh planov,” to
USSR Minister of Justice Rychkov and RSFSR Minister of Justice Basavin (Mar. 13, 1947).
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151. Shilov and others. Folios 32-32ob: RSFSR Minister of Justice Basavin, "Ob usilenie bor'by s pripiskami v
otchetakh o vypolenenii proizvodstvennykh planov po RSFSR za mart mesiats 1947 goda,” to USSR
Minister of Justice Rychkov (May 21, 1947).
152. Zheltyshev and others. Folios 33-34: Uzbek SSR Minister of Justice V. Umarov, , "O sostoianii
rassmotreniia v sudakh Uzbek. SSR del, sviazannykh s pripriskami k gosudarstvennoi otchetnosti za mai
1947 g.,” to USSR Minister of Justice Rychkov (Jul. 8, 1947).
153. Agafonov and others. Folios 35-43: USSR Ministry of Justice, inspector of general courts Chugunov,
"Obobshchenie sudeb'noi praktiki po delam o pripiskakh k gosudarstvennoi otchetnosti po vypolneniiu
planov” (April 1947).
154. Kozyrov and others. Folio 44: Azerbaidzhan SSR Deputy Minister of Justice Alimamedov, memorandum
to, USSR Deputy Minister of Justice Rubichev (Aug. 15, 1947).
155. Naumenko. Folio 46: Belorussian SSR Minister of Justice Paduto, "O rassmotrenii sudami Belorusskoi SSR
del o pripiskhakh v otchetakh o vypolnenii proizvodstvennykh planov,” to USSR Minister of Justice
Rychkov (May 24, 1947).
156. Nurmetov and others. Folio 49: Uzbek SSR Minister of Justice V. Umarov, memorandum to USSR Minister
of Justice Rychkov (Nov. 24, 1947).
157. Sharikov. Folios 52-53: Uzbek SSR Deputy Minister of Justice, "O delakh, postupivshikh v narodnye sudy
Uzb. SSR, sviazannykh s pripiskami v otchetakh o vypolnenii gosudarstvennykh planov za iiun' mes. 1947
g.,” to USSR Minister of Justice Rychkov (Aug. 28, 1947).
158. Tashibaev. Folios 52-53: Uzbek SSR Deputy Minister of Justice, "O delakh, postupivshikh v narodnye sudy
Uzb. SSR, sviazannykh s pripiskami v otchetakh o vypolnenii gosudarstvennykh planov za iiun' mes. 1947
g.,” to USSR Minister of Justice Rychkov (Aug. 28, 1947).
159. Akhmedov and others. Folios 52-53: Uzbek SSR Deputy Minister of Justice, "O delakh, postupivshikh v
narodnye sudy Uzb. SSR, sviazannykh s pripiskami v otchetakh o vypolnenii gosudarstvennykh planov za
iiun' mes. 1947 g.,” to USSR Minister of Justice Rychkov (Aug. 28, 1947).Appendix 2. Party Control Cases, 1943 to 1962
Cases 201 to 301 are taken from the files of the party control commission of the
Soviet Communist Party, held on microfilm by the Hoover Archive, (RGANI, fond 6,
opis 6), as follows.
201. Tarasenko and others. File 1583, folios 10-14. KPK controller Samusenko, “O faktakh ochkovtiratel’stva v
soobshcheniiakh o vypolnenii programmy na zavodakh No. 8 NKB i No. 266 NKAP, No. 255 NKTP, No. 541
NKB i trestakh Azneftekombinata,” to KPK chair Andreev A. A. (July 15, 1944).
202. Fratkin and others. File 1583, folios 10-14. KPK controller Samusenko, “O faktakh ochkovtiratel’stva v
soobshcheniiakh o vypolnenii programmy na zavodakh No. 8 NKB i No. 266 NKAP, No. 255 NKTP, No. 541
NKB i trestakh Azneftekombinata,” to KPK chair Andreev A. A. (July 15, 1944).
203. Dikarev and others. File 1583, folios 10-14. KPK controller Samusenko, “O faktakh ochkovtiratel’stva v
soobshcheniiakh o vypolnenii programmy na zavodakh No. 8 NKB i No. 266 NKAP, No. 255 NKTP, No. 541
NKB i trestakh Azneftekombinata,” to KPK chair Andreev A. A. (July 15, 1944).
204. Vasil'ev. File 1583, folios 10-14. KPK controller Samusenko, “O faktakh ochkovtiratel’stva v
soobshcheniiakh o vypolnenii programmy na zavodakh No. 8 NKB i No. 266 NKAP, No. 255 NKTP, No. 541
NKB i trestakh Azneftekombinata,” to KPK chair Andreev A. A. (July 15, 1944).
205. Moroz and others. File 1583, folios 10-14. KPK controller Samusenko, “O faktakh ochkovtiratel’stva v
soobshcheniiakh o vypolnenii programmy na zavodakh No. 8 NKB i No. 266 NKAP, No. 255 NKTP, No. 541
NKB i trestakh Azneftekombinata,” to KPK chair Andreev A. A. (July 15, 1944).
206. Aleshin. File 1583, folios 10-14. KPK controller Samusenko, “O faktakh ochkovtiratel’stva v
soobshcheniiakh o vypolnenii programmy na zavodakh No. 8 NKB i No. 266 NKAP, No. 255 NKTP, No. 541
NKB i trestakh Azneftekombinata,” to KPK chair Andreev A. A. (July 15, 1944).
207. Babaev. File 1583, folios 10-14. KPK controller Samusenko, “O faktakh ochkovtiratel’stva v
soobshcheniiakh o vypolnenii programmy na zavodakh No. 8 NKB i No. 266 NKAP, No. 255 NKTP, No. 541
NKB i trestakh Azneftekombinata,” to KPK chair Andreev A. A. (July 15, 1944).
208. Minasov. File 1583, folios 10-14. KPK controller Samusenko, “O faktakh ochkovtiratel’stva v
soobshcheniiakh o vypolnenii programmy na zavodakh No. 8 NKB i No. 266 NKAP, No. 255 NKTP, No. 541
NKB i trestakh Azneftekombinata,” to KPK chair Andreev A. A. (July 15, 1944).
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209. Demidov and others. File 1583, folios 15-16. KPK controller Samusenko, “Spravka po pis’mu byvshego
direktora zavoda No. 63 NKB t. Demidova I. D.,” to KPK chair Shkiriatov M. F. (no date).
210. Isaev and others. File 1583, folios 20-21ob. KPK controller Alekseev, “Spravka po zapiske Ministra
gosudarstvennogo kontrolia SSSR t. Mekhlisa,” to KPK chair Shkiriatov M. F. (no date)
211. Nilov and others. File 1583, folio 22; 26-27. KPK controller Velichkin, memorandum to KPK deputy chair
Iagodkin I. A. (no date). Kaluga district party committee Secretary Popov I., “Vypiska iz protokola No. 104
zasedaniia biuro Kaluzhskogo Obkoma VKP(b) ot 19 noiabria 1946 goda. O faktakh antigosudarstvennoi
praktiki v provedenii khlebozagotovok po Spas-Demenskomu raionu v 1945 godu” (25 Nov., 1946).
212. Sysoev and others. File 1583, folio 28. KPK controller Nikoforov, “Spravka po zapiske Upolnomochennogo
KPK pri TsK VKP(b) po Udmurtskoi ASSR t. Gal’tsova ‘O rezul’tatakh proverki anonimnykh zaiavlenii na
byvshego sekretaria Grakhovetskogo raikoma VKP(b) Sysoeva P.P.,” to KPK chair Shkiriatov M. F. (no
date)
213. Batov. File 1583, folio 29. KPK controller Sarafonov, memorandum to KPK deputy chair Iagodkin I. A. (May
13, 1948)
214. Zubenko and others. File 1583, folios 31-33. KPK controller Zakharov, “Spravka po zaiavleniiu chlena
VKP(b), p.b. No. 1981699 tov. Shaganskogo R.L.,” to KPK deputy chair Iagodkin I. A. (Oct. 26, 1948)
215. Pichko and others. File 1583, folios 34-35. KPK controller Gurov, “Spravka po zaiavleniiam
Zheligovskogo,” to KPK deputy chair Iagodkin I. A. (no date)
216. Dvornikov and others. File 1583, folios 39-40. KPK controller Petrova, memorandum to KPK deputy chair
Iagodkin I. A. (no date)
217. Rybina and others. File 1583, folios 41-42. KPK controller Zhuravlev, “Spravka o rezul’tatakh proverki
anonimnogo zaiavleniia o neporiadkakh v rabote 4-i avtobazy 1-go Moskovskogo tresta khlebopecheniia
Ministerstva pishchevoi promyshlennosti SSSR,” to KPK deputy chair Iagodkin I. A. (March 25, 1950)
218. Bessolov and others. File 1583, folio 43. KPK controller Kharitonov, memorandum to KPK deputy chair
Iagodkin I. A. (no date).
219. Sil'vanets. File 1583, folios 44-45. KPK controller Tamirov, memorandum to KPK deputy chair Iagodkin I.
A. (no date).
220. Martynov and others. File 1583, folios 46-47; 48-49; 58. KPK controller Kharitonov, memorandum to KPK
deputy chair Shkiriatov M. F. (no date); Cheliabinsk district party committee secretary Beloborodov,
“Vypiska iz protokola No. 159 punkt No. 4 zasedaniia biuro obkoma ot 30.VIII.1949 g.” (Jan. 6, 1950);
Shkiriatov M., memorandum to Malenkov G. M. (April 19, 1951)
221. Zuev and others. File 1583, folios 50-51; 52-55; 56-57. KPK controller Prokhorov, memorandum to KPK
deputy chair Shkiriatov M. F. (March 27, 1951); KPK Party Collegium, assistant member Mironov,
“Spravka o rezul’tatakh proverki zaiavleniia chlena VKP(b) t. Pakhomova F.G.,” to KPK deputy chair
Shkiriatov M. F. (no date); Klin city party committee secretary Zakharov, memorandum to KPK (March 20,
1951)
222. Fedorov and others. File 1583, folios 59-60. KPK controller Golovin, memorandum to KPK deputy chair
Shkiriatov M. F. (1951)
223. Miklashevskii and others. File 1583, folio 61. KPK controller Tarasov, memorandum to KPK deputy chair
Shkiriatov M. F. (1951)
224. Zhukov V.D. and others. File 1583, folios 62-63; 64; 65-66; 67-68ob. KPK controller Byshov, memorandum
to KPK deputy chair Shkiriatov M. F. (1951); Moscow district party committee, department of
engineering, manager Grishin, memorandum to Shkiriatov, M.F. (Sept. 10, 1951); Moscow district party
committee, department of engineering, manager Grishin, “Spravka po pis’mu (bez podpisi) s Orekho-
Zuevskogo zavoda ‘Respirator’,” to Moscow district party committee secretary Volkov A. P. (Sept. 5,
1951); Orekho-Zuevskii city party committee secretary (name illegible), “Vypiska iz protokola No. 24
zasedaniia biuro ot 30 avgusta 1951 g.” (Sept. 17, 1951)
225. Serezhnikov and others. File 1583, folios 69-70; 71. KPK controller Kalistratov, memorandum to KPK
deputy chair Shkiriatov M. F. (1952); Moscow district party committee secretary Grishin V., “Spravka po
pis’mu t. Tsvetkovoi M.D.,” to KPK (Dec. 2, 1952)
226. Radchik and others. File 1583, folios 72-74. KPK controller Vnuzdaev, memorandum to KPK deputy chair
Shkiriatov M. F. (no date)
227. Krivosheev and others. File 1583, folios 79-81. KPK controller Fedorenko, memorandum to KPK deputy
chair Shkiriatov M. F. (no date)
228. Valitskii. File 1652, folios 1-2. KPK controller Chesnokov, memorandum to KPK chair Iagodkin I. A. (Oct.
17, 1952)
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229. Andreev and others. File 1652, folio 3. KPK controller Vnuzdaev, memorandum to KPK chair Shkiriatov M.
F. (October 20, 1952)
230. Kirilovich and others. File 1652, folios 4-5. KPK controller Tarasov, memorandum to KPK chair Shkiriatov
M. F. (August 27, 1952)
231. Vershinin and others. File 1652, folios 8-10. KPK controller Obalin, memorandum to KPK chair Shkiriatov
M. F. (Jan. 19, 1953)
232. Milov and others. File 1652, folios 11-12. KPK controller Oreshin, memorandum to KPK chair Shkiriatov
M. F. (Feb. 19, 1953)
233. Kochnev and others. File 1652, folio 25. KPK controller Zhukov, memorandum to KPK chair Shkiriatov M.
F. (March 8, 1953)
234. Luk'ianenko and others. File 1652, folios 28-30. KPK controller Cherenov, memorandum to KPK chair
Shkiriatov M. F. (March 26, 1953); KPK controller Ablazov, memorandum to KPK chair Shkiriatov M. F.
(March 20, 1953); Odessa district party committee secretary Makarov, memorandum to KPK secretariat
manager Sidorov (April 30, 1953)
235. Alekseev and others. File 1652, folio 31; 32-33; 34-35. KPK controller Ablazov, memorandum to KPK chair
Shkiriatov M. F. (March 20, 1953); Odessa district party committee secretary Makarov, memorandum to
KPK secretariat manager Sidorov (April 30, 1953); Odessa district party committee secretary Makarov,
memorandum to KPK secretariat manager Sidorov (March 4, 1953)
236. Egorov and others. File 1652, folios 36-37. KPK controller Guliaev, memorandum to KPK chair Shkiriatov
M. F. (March 21, 1953)
237. Vasilevskii and others. File 1652, folios 38-39; 40. KPK controller Fedostsev, memorandum to KPK chair
Shkiriatov M. F. (March 23, 1953); KPK controller Ovchinnikov, memorandum to KPK chair Shkiriatov M.
F. (April 18, 1953)
238. Semenko and others. File 1652, folios 41-42. KPK controller Verushkin, memorandum to KPK chair
Shkiriatov M. F. (May 20, 1953)
239. Vol'-Epshtein. File 1652, folios 43-44. KPK controller Alferov, memorandum to KPK chair Shkiriatov M. F.
(May 21, 1953)
240. Mirsaidov. File 1652, folios 45-46. KPK controller Serdiukov, memorandum to KPK chair Shkiriatov M. F.
(June 1, 1953)
241. Semenkov and others. File 1652, folios 47-48. KPK controller Osadchii, memorandum to KPK chair
Shkiriatov M. F. (June 30, 1953)
242. Bol'shakov and others. File 1652, folios 49-50. KPK controller Sudakov, memorandum to KPK chair
Shkiriatov M. F. (July 11, 1953)
243. Bol'shakov and others. File 1652, folio 52. KPK controller Serdiukov, memorandum to KPK chair Shkiriatov
M. F. (July 16, 1953)
244. Ermikov and others. File 1652, folio 53; 59-60; 61. KPK controller Vologzhanin, memorandum to KPK chair
Shkiriatov M. F. (Aug. 3, 1953); KPK controller Vologzhanin, memorandum to KPK chair Shkiriatov M. F.
(no date); Kaluga district party committee secretary Zarubin, memorandum to KPK (July 10, 1953,
replying to KPK memorandum dated April 29, 1953)
245. Tarasenko and others. File 1652, folios 62; 63-64. KPK controller Sdobnov, memorandum to KPK deputy
chair Komarov P. T. (no date); Moscow district party committee secretary Grishin V., “Spravka po pis’mu
bez podpisi,” to KPK (May 19, 1953)
246. Tregubov and others. File 1652, folios 65-66. KPK controller Konovalov, memorandum to KPK chair
Shkiriatov M. F. (no date)
247. Denisov and others. File 1652, folio 67. KPK controller Kharitonov, memorandum to KPK chair Shkiriatov
M. F. (Oct. 1, 1953)
248. Shoshin and others. File 1706, folios 1-5. Shvernik, “O narusheniiakh zakonov po zagotovkam s/x
produktov v Pushkinskom raione Moskovskoi oblasti,” to the RSFSR party central committee bureau
(June 5, 1956).
249. Jews and others. File 1706, folios 14-14ob. KPK instructor Savin, memorandum to KPK (Aug. 5, 1957)
250. Rogachev and others. File 1706, folio 15; 16-21; 22; 23-24. Komarov, memorandum to the party Central
Committee bureau for the RSFSR (July 25, 1957); KPK controller Vologzhanin, memorandum to KPK (8
July 1957); KPK controller Vologzhanin, “V dopolnenie k zapiske” (1957); Tiumen district party committee
secretary Kosov, “Vypiska iz protokola No. 44 zasedaniia biuro obkoma KPSS ot 27 avgusta 1957. Zapiska
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otvetstvennogo kontrolera KPK pri TsK KPSS tov. Vologzhanina ‘O faktakh nedostachi khleba na
glubinnykh punktakh Ishimskogo raiona.”
251. Nadkernichnyi and others. File 1706, folios 35-36. Vinnitsa district party committee secretary Kozyr, “O
faktakh pripisok k gosudarstevennoi otchetnosti po proizvodstvu produktov zhivotnovodstva v kolkhoze
im. Shevchenko, Vinnitskogo raiona” (Dec. 9, 1958)
252. Diukov and others. File 1765, folio 1; 2-4; 5. Boitsov, memorandum to the party Central Committee
(1959); KPK instructor Trofimov, memorandum to KPK (1959); Draft resolution of KPK “Zaiavlenie t.
Guseva I. ob antigosudarstvennoi praktike prodazhi gosudarstvu molochnykh produktov kolkhozami
Krasnokholmskogo raiona Kalininskoi oblasti” (1959)
253. Khaidarov and others. File 1765, folios 6-16; 17. KPK instructor Fedorenko, “O rezul’tatakh proverki
zhaloby Nikolaenko M.A. i o fakhtakh nepravil’nogo otnosheniia k kritike nedostatkov v Surkhan-
Dar’inskoi oblasti Uzbekistana,” to KPK (Aug. 19, 1959); KPK member Dzhurabaev, memorandum to KPK
(Oct. 22, 1959)
254. Palii and others. File 1765, folio 18. KPK controller Serdiukov, “Spravka” (Oct. 10, 1959)
255. Bagurkin and others. File 1765, folios 19-23. KPK instructor Egorov, memorandum to KPK (1960)
256. Pushkarev and others. File 1765, folios 24-25. KPK instructor Guliaev, memorandum to KPK (March 16,
1960)
257. Kryzhanovskii and others. File 1765, folio 26. KPK controller Gurov, memorandum (May 26, 1960)
258. Trosteniuk and others. File 1765, folios 28-32; 33-35; 36-37; 38-39. KPK controller Vologzhanin,
memorandum to KPK (Jan. 4, 1961); Predsedateli kolkhozov, “Ob antigosudarstvennoi praktiki pripisok i
postoiannom ochkovitiratel’stve i obmane gosudarstva so storony rukovoditelei Zhitomiskoi oblasti”
(1961); Shvernik N. M., memorandum to the Ukraine party central committee, comrade Podgorny N. V.
(Feb. 20, 1961); Ukraine party central committee secretary Podgornyi N. V., memorandum to the CPSU
central committee, Shvernik N. M. (April 13, 1961)
259. Popov and others. File 1765, folio 40. KPK controller Serdiukov, “Spravka,” (Feb. 8, 1961)
260. Not named. File 1765, folio 41. KPK instructor Breivo, “Spravka” (1961)
261. Voronin and others. File 1765, folio 42; 43-48. Baskakov S., Efremov M., and Boitsov I., to the party
central committee (March 1961); RSFSR party central committee department of industry and transport,
instructor Mordvintsev, RSFSR department of party organs, instructor Bezotvetnykh, and KPK controller
Gurov, to the party central committee (1961).
262. Fufygin and others. File 1765, folios 49-52. KPK controller Chesnokov, “Spravka o faktakh
ochkovitiratel’stva i pripiskakh v Kaliniskoi oblasti,” to KPK (no date)
263. Mymrenko. File 1765, folio 53. KPK controller Sudakov, “Spravka” (1961)
264. Filatov and others. File 1765, folio 54. KPK instructor Ivanin, “Spravka po zaiavleniiu chlenov partbiuro
partorganizatsii Tsentral’nogo otdeleniia sovkhoza ‘Krasnaia Zaria’ Stupinskogo raiona” (April 13, 1961)
265. Not named. File 1765, folio 55. KPK instructor Guliaev, “Spravka” (1961)
266. Bazarov and others. File 1765, folios 57-58. KPK controller Kharitonov, Spravka (1961)
267. Kalygin and others. File 1765, folios 59-60ob. KPK instructor Guliaev, memorandum to KPK (1961)
268. Sheikin and others. File 1765, folios 61; 62-8. KPK controller Zhukov, “Spravka” (1961); KPK controllers
Zhukov and Shuvalova, RSFSR central committee, department of party organs, instructor Timofeev, and
department of agriculture, instructor Golosov, memorandum to KPK chair Shvernik N.M. (Sept. 1, 1961)
269. Nekhamkin. File 1765, folios 69-71. KPK instructor Ivashura, “Spravka” to KPK (June ,8 1961)
270. Konstantinov and others. File 1765, folios 72-77. KPK controller Cherenov, memorandum to KPK (June 17,
1961)
271. Ofrin and others. File 1765, folios 78-79. KPK controller Vologzhanin, “Spravka,” to KPK (1961)
272. Pavlov and others. File 1765, folio 80. KPK instructor Khalevin, “Spravka” (20 June 1961)
273. Chachin and others. File 1765, folio 81. KPK instructor Kazakov, “Spravka po pis’mu t. Ianina A.N.” (July
26, 1961)
274. Shmatov. File 1765, folios 86-87. KPK controller Serdiukov, memorandum to KPK (1961)
275. Tkachenko and others. File 1765, folios 88-90. KPK controller Sudakov, “Spravka” (1961)
276. Galkin. File 1765, folios 91-92. KPK instructor Ivashura, “Spravka” to KPK (1961)
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277. Volkov and others. File 1765, folios 94-95. KPK instructor Guliaev, , “Spravka” (1961)
278. Ignatenko and others. File 1765, folio 99. KPK controller Sudakov, “Spravka” to KPK (1961)
279. Not named. File 1815, folio 1. KPK controller Kharitonov, “Spravka” (1961)
280. Besedin and others. File 1815, folios 2-3. KPK controller Morozov, memorandum to KPK (Nov. 14, 1961)
281. Tuimedov. File 1815, folio 4. KPK instructor Ivanin, “Spravka po zaiavleniiu chlenov KPSS Saigina I.P. i
Ivashkina P.E.” (Dec. 27, 1961).
282. Samedov and others. File 1815, folios 5-6. KPK controller Kirillov, “Spravka” (1962)
283. Kolevatov and others. File 1815, folio 7. KPK instructor Gorbenko, “Spravka o rezul’tatakh proverki pis’ma
v KPK chlena KPSS Anikina A.I.” (Jan. 29, 62)
284. Not named. File 1815, folio 8. KPK instructor Urusov, memorandum to KPK (Feb. 13, 1962)
285. Zakharov. File 1815, folio 9. KPK instructor Ivashura, “Spravka” to KPK (March 2, 1962)
286. Sokolov and others. File 1815, folios 10-12. KPK instructor Gorbenko, “Spravka o rezul’tatakh proverki
pis’ma (bez podpisi) iz gor. Gukovo, Rostovskoi oblasti” (1962)
287. Kukhorenko and others. File 1815, folios 10-12. KPK instructor Gorbenko, “Spravka o rezul’tatakh
proverki pis’ma (bez podpisi) iz gor. Gukovo, Rostovskoi oblasti” (1962)
288. Nazarov and others. File 1815, folios 10-12. KPK instructor Gorbenko, instructor KPK, “Spravka o
rezul’tatakh proverki pis’ma (bez podpisi) iz gor. Gukovo, Rostovskoi oblasti” (1962)
289. Galachalov and others. File 1815, folios 13-15. KPK controller Kharitonov, “Spravka” (April 28, 1962)
290. Roizenblit and others. File 1815, folios 18-20. KPK instructor Sarafonov, “Spravka,” to KPK (May 21, 1962)
291. Leonov. File 1815, folio 22. KPK instructor Gorbenko, “Spravka po pis’mu v Komitet Partiinogo Kontrolia
kommunistov Taganrogskoi partorganizatsii Solomakha N.K., Bondareva G.T., i Tsenenkova S.M.” (1962)
292. Poletaev. File 1815, folio 23. KPK instructor Ivanin, “Spravka po anonimnomu pis’mu iz g. Serpukhov”
(June 11, 1962).
293. Maliuk. File 1815, folio 24. KPK controller Sudakov, “Spravka” (Aug. 23, 1962)
294. Nemov. File 1815, folios 25-26. KPK instructor Guliaev, “Spravka” (1962)
295. Agabalaev. File 1816, folios 1-2. KPK instructor Bondarev, “Spravka o rezul’tatakh proverki telegrammy,
postupivshei v KPK pri TsK KPSS ot kolkhoznika sel’khozarteli imeni Zhdanova Kubinskogo raiona
Azerbaidzhanskoi SSR Atamoglanova” (Nov. 14, 1962)
296. Liubitskii and others. File 1816, folios 3-4. KPK controller Smorodin, to KPK chair Shkiriatov (1953)
297. Nikitin and others. File 1816, folios 8-10. KPK controller Khorin, “Spravka” (1959)
298. Ivanov. File 1816, folio 12. KPK controller Vologzhanin, “Spravka” (1960)
299. Fadeev and others. File 1816, folio 13. KPK controller Cherenov, “Spravka” (1960)
300. Shelepov and others. File 1816, folios 14-16. KPK controller Gorbachev, “Spravka o rezul’tatakh proverki
zaiavleniia Novikova iz Uiarskogo zernosovkhoza Krasnoiarskogo kraia” (1961)
301. Baburkin and others. File 1816, folio 17. KPK instructor Ivanin, “Spravka po anonimnomu pis’mu,
postupivshemu iz Lotoshinskogo raiona Moscovskoi oblasti” (1961)Appendix 3. Prosecution Cases, 1948 and 1949
Cases 401 to 407 are taken from the files of the USSR Procurator’s Office held on
microfilm by the Hoover Archive (GARF, fond R-8131, opisi 25 and 26), as follows.
401. Egorov and others. Opis 25, file 583, folios 10-11: Kishinev city prosecutor Almazov, "Spetsdonesenie," to
USSR prosecution service, chief of investigative section Sheinin (Jan. 20, 1948). File 583, folios 38-39:
Kishinev procuracy, investigative department chief Bondarenko, "Obvinitel'noe zakliuchenie" (March 26,
1948).
402. Unnamed managers of the Smelianskii engineering factory. Opis 25, file 583, folios 12-13:, Kiev district
procuracy, investigation department chief Kipnis, memorandum to USSR prosecution service, chief of
investigative department Sheinin (Jan. 30, 1948)
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403. Gurinovich and others. Opis 25, file 583, f. 21: Belorussian SSR procuracy, investigation department chief
(name illegible), memorandum to USSR procuracy, deputy chief of investigative section Aleksandrov
(1/3/48)
404. Mirkin and others. Opis 25, file 583, f. 22: Stalino city prosecutor Filatov, memorandum to USSR
prosecutor general Safonov (March 2, 1948); File 583, folios 44-45: Stalino city, Kalinin ward, court of
district no. 1, verdict in the case of Batozskii D. I. and Mirkin L. Ia.
405. Grienko. Opis 25, file 583, f. 28:, Kiev district procuracy, investigation department chief Kipnis,
memorandum to USSR procuracy, chief of investigative section Sheinin (March 30, 1948)
406. Pudovkin and others. Opis 25, file 583, folios 61: Stalingrad district prosecutor Vavilov, memorandum to
USSR procuracy, investigation department chief Sheinin (August 5, 1948)
407. Kogan and others. Opis 26, file 821, folios 1-2: USSR deputy minister for the metallurgical industry
Sheremet'ev A., “Prikaz po Ministerstvu metallurgicheskoi promyshlennosti No. 681” (Oct 31, 1949)
(Mekhlis L., “Prikaz Ministra goskontroli SSSR No. 941”)Appendix 4. Populations and Distances, 1959
The table below lists the populations of 150 Soviet districts (defined as major city,
oblast, krai, ASSR, and SSR) in the 1959 USSR census and the distances from Moscow
in kilometres of the associated district centres. Census figures of 1959 by district are
from TsSU (1962). For each district, I used Google Earth to measure the great circle
distance to the nearest 5 kilometers from the provincial centre to Moscow, except
that I give any points within Moscow city and the surrounding oblast as one and 50
kilometers from the centre respectively.
Territory Status District Centre Population Km from Moscow
Moscow City Moscow 5085581 1
Moscow Oblast Moscow 5863093 50
Kalinin Oblast Kalinin 1806787 160
Kaluga Oblast Kaluga 935852 165
Tula Oblast Tula 1920308 175
Vladimir Oblast Vladimir 1402371 180
Riazan Oblast Riazan 1444755 185
Iaroslavl Oblast Iaroslavl 1395627 250
Ivanovo Oblast Ivanovo 1322152 250
Kostroma Oblast Kostroma 919999 300
Orel Oblast Orel 929013 335
Briansk Oblast Briansk 1549945 345
Smolensk Oblast Smolensk 1142969 370
Lipetsk Oblast Lipetsk 1141522 375
Vologda Oblast Vologda 1307531 405
Gorkii Oblast Gorkii 3590813 405
Tambov Oblast Tambov 1549001 415
Kursk Oblast Kursk 1483305 455
Voronezh Oblast Voronezh 2368740 465
Vitebsk Oblast Vitebsk 1276113 470
Novgorod Oblast Novgorod 736529 495
Mogilev Oblast Mogilev 1166081 510
Mordovia ASSR Saransk 1000193 515
Chuvash ASSR Shumerlia 1097859 555
Gomel Oblast Gomel 1361841 560
Penza Oblast Penza 1509566 560
Belgorod Oblast Belgorod 1226328 580
Sumy Oblast Sumy 1513718 590
Pskov Oblast Pskov 951866 610
Cherkass Oblast Cherkaska 1503254 615
Leningrad City Leningrad 3321196 635
Leningrad Oblast Leningrad 1244991 635
Chernigov Oblast Chernigov 1553773 635
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Territory Status District Centre Population Km from Moscow
Mari ASSR Yoshkar-Ola 647680 640
Kharkov Oblast Kharkov 2520129 650
Minsk City Minsk 509489 675
Minsk Oblast Minsk 1473030 675
Karelia ASSR Petrozavodsk 651346 695
Ulianovsk Oblast Ulianovsk 1117359 705
Poltava Oblast Poltava 1631706 715
Tatar ASSR Kazan 2850417 720
Saratov Oblast Saratov 2162751 730
Kiev City Kiev 1104334 755
Kiev Oblast Kiev 1719100 755
Lugansk Oblast Lugansk 2452172 765
Lithuania SSR Vilnius 2711445 795
Kirov Oblast Kirov 1916493 820
Dnepropetrovsk Oblast Dnepropetrovsk 2704783 830
Nikolaevsk Oblast Nikolaevsk 1013839 830
Latvia SSR Riga 2093458 845
Zhitomir Oblast Zhitomir 1603604 855
Donetsk Oblast Donetsk 4262048 860
Kuibyshev Oblast Kuibyshev 2258359 865
Estonia SSR Tallin 1196791 870
Kirovograd Oblast Kirovograd 1217929 885
Zaporozhe Oblast Zaporozhe 1463849 895
Grodno Oblast Grodno 1077365 915
Volgograd Oblast Stalingrad 1853928 915
Rovno Oblast Rovno 926225 945
Vinnitsa Oblast Vinnitsa 2142045 945
Rostov Oblast Rostov on Don 3311747 960
Udmurt ASSR Izhevsk 1336927 970
Volyn Oblast Lutsk 890456 990
Brest Oblast Brest-Litovsk 1190729 995
Arkhangel Oblast Arkhangelsk 1275839 1000
Komi ASSR Syktyvkar 806199 1005
Khmelnitska Oblast Khmelnitska 1611412 1015
Ural Oblast Uralsk 381181 1035
Ternopol Oblast Ternopol 1085586 1055
Kherson Oblast Kherson 824167 1065
Kaliningrad Oblast Kaliningrad 610885 1090
Lvov Oblast L'vov 2107858 1125
Moldavia SSR Kishinev 2884477 1130
Odessa Oblast Odessa 2026609 1140
Kalmyk ASSR Elista 184857 1145
Chernovitsa Oblast Chernovtsy 774121 1145
Ivano-Frankovsk Oblast Ivano-Frankovsk 1094639 1155
Perm Oblast Perm 2992876 1155
Bashkir ASSR Ufa 3341609 1170
Krasnodar Krai Krasnodar 3762499 1195
Stavropol Krai Stavropol 1882911 1230
Orenburg Oblast Orenburg 1829481 1235
Crimea Oblast Sevastopol 1201517 1260
Astrakhan Oblast Astrakhan 701974 1265
Zakarpatia Oblast Uzhgorod 920173 1300
Karaganda Oblast Karaganda 1018661 1320
Gurev Oblast Atyrau 287803 1370
Sverdlovsk Oblast Sverdlovsk 4044416 1420
Kabardino-Balkar ASSR Nalchik 420115 1430
Aktiubinsk Oblast Aktiubinsk 401049 1450
Murmansk Oblast Murmansk 567672 1490
Chechen-Ingush ASSR Groznyi 710424 1500
Cheliabinsk Oblast Cheliabinsk 2976625 1500
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N Osetia ASSR Vladikavkaz 450581 1510
Dagestan ASSR Makhachkala 1062472 1590
Georgia SSR Tbilisi 4044045 1640
Kustanaisk Oblast Kustanay 710690 1700
Tiumen Oblast Tiumen 1092126 1720
Kurgan Oblast Kurgan 999170 1735
Armenia SSR Erevan 1763048 1810
Azerbaidzhan SSR Baku 3697717 1935
N Kazakh Oblast Petropavlovsk 456999 1980
Kokchetavsk Oblast Kokshetau 493319 2050
Kzyl-Ordinsk Oblast Qyzylorda 327323 2180
Tashauz Oblast Tashauz 294832 2240
Omsk Oblast Omsk 1645017 2240
Tselinograd Oblast Astana 637115 2275
Khorezm Oblast Khiva 380583 2300
Kara-Kalpak ASSR Nukus 510101 2385
Ashkhabad City Ashkhabad 169935 2515
Ashkhabad Raiony Ashkhabad 313233 2515
Bukhara Oblast Bukhara 584810 2545
Pavlodar Oblast Pavlodar 455013 2565
Chardzhou Oblast Chardzhou 320797 2675
Mari Oblast Mari 417578 2710
Chimkent Oblast Shymkent 921370 2730
Dzhambul Oblast Taraz 561546 2785
Samarkand Oblast Samarkand 1148231 2795
Tashkent City Tashkent 911930 2795
Tashkent Oblast Tashkent 1348951 2795
Fergana Oblast Fergana 1138770 2805
Novosibirsk Oblast Novosibirsk 2298481 2820
Semipalatinsk Oblast Semipalatinsk 520229 2865
Tomsk Oblast Tomsk 746802 2880
Altai Krai Barnaul 2683231 2945
Surkhan-Daria Oblast Denau 919348 2965
Frunze City Bishkek 219711 3000
Frunze Raiony Bishkek 840696 3000
Dushanbe City Dushanbe 227137 3000
Dushanbe Raiony Dushanbe 1679723 3000
Kemerovo Oblast Kemerovo 2785906 3000
Andizhan Oblast Andizhan 1162980 3020
E Kazakh Krai Oskemen 734924 3020
Osh Oblast Osh 869408 3070
Alma Ata City Almaty 456481 3115
Alma Ata Oblast Almaty 946144 3115
Tian-Shan Oblast Naryn 136022 3190
Gorno-Badakhshan Ao Khorugh 73037 3255
Krasnoiarsk Krai Krasnoiarsk 2615098 3365
Tuva ASSR Kyzyl 171928 3665
Irkutsk Oblast Irkutsk 1976453 4220
Buriat ASSR Ulan-Ude 673326 4445
Chita Oblast Chita 1036387 4770
Iakut ASSR Iakutsk 487343 4900
Amur Oblast Blagoveshchensk 717514 5625
Magadan Oblast Magadan 235578 5900
Khabarovsk Krai Khabarovsk 1142535 6135
Primorsk Krai Vladivostok 1381018 6405
Sakhalin Oblast Iuzhno-Sakhalinsk 649405 6665
Kamchatka Oblast Petropavlovsk-Kamchatskii 220753 6850
